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L Introduction
Consider a federal prosecution that occurs after a state prosecution. The
federal prosecution concerns the very same defendant, conduct, and evidence
as did the state prosecution. In the state prosecution, the state court sup-
pressed evidence on federal constitutional grounds; subsequently, a jury
acquitted the defendant. In the federal prosecution, the federal court refuses
to give collateral estoppel effect to the previous state court suppression ruling.
In fact, the federal court does not even consider why the state court suppressed
the evidence on federal constitutional grounds; instead, it treats the state
court's suppression ruling as if it were a nullity.
This scenario raises many questions. First, how could a federal prosecu-
tion occur after a state prosecution in this situation? Isn't this a violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause? Second, why doesn't the federal court even
consider why the state court suppressed such evidence? Shouldn't the federal
court give some sort of deference to the findings of the state court under
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principles of comity? Unfortunately, for many defendants the answer to each
of these questions is no. The subsequent federal prosecution does not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause because the prohibition on double jeopardy is not
enforceable when two distinct sovereigns, such as the state and federal gov-
ernments are involved.' Similarly, the federal court owes no deference to the
state court suppression ruling because the federal government was not a party
to the prior prosecution, and therefore the federal government is not bound by
the state court's actions.
2
But what if federal courts gave substantial deference to state courts in
other collateral proceedings, such as those that occur when a federal court
considers a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus?3 Suppose that
federal courts in this situation must give complete deference to state court
findings of fact, substantial deference to state court findings on mixed ques-
tions of law and fact, and even some degree of deference to state court find-
ings on questions of federal law. Wouldn't this deference that federal courts
exhibit in the habeas context also apply to other criminal collateral proceed-
ings? Shouldn't notions of fairness, justice, and simple uniformity in federal
criminal law compel federal courts to apply deference in all such collateral
proceedings?
Apparently not. Even after Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),4 which extensively reformed
habeas corpus law and mandated strong deference to state court evidentiary
findings, federal courts still allow the introduction of evidence that a state
court previously suppressed into federal collateral proceedings that occur
under the dual sovereignty exception.5 Federal courts, still clinging to the
1. See infra Part HA (discussing dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy
prohibition). This Note refers to this doctrine as the "dual sovereignty doctrine." Some courts
and commentators also refer to the doctrine as the "separate sovereignty doctrine."
2. See infra Part it (discussing dual sovereignty doctrine as applied to suppression of
evidence rulings).
3. See infra Part TV (explaining similarities between dual sovereignty proceedings and
habeas proceedings). This Note uses the term "collateral proceedings" to refer to a federal
prosecution that occurs after a state prosecution under the dual sovereignty doctrine as well as
a habeas corpus proceeding that occurs after a state prosecution. Part IV of this Note explains
why this terminology is proper for both proceedings.
4. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
5. See United States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that state court
suppression ruling did not collaterally estop federal government from using evidence in
subsequent federal prosecution occurring under dual sovereignty exception); United States v.
Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634-35 (W.D. Va. 2001) (finding that federal court was not bound
by principles of res judicata or comity to follow earlier state court decision to exclude evidence).
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notion that the federal and state governments are separate sovereigns, find that
they can rule independently on the suppression of evidence in a federal
prosecution, even when a state court suppressed the same evidence in a prior
state prosecution on federal constitutional grounds.6
This Note argues that federal courts' refusal to defer to state court rulings
on suppression issues in these circumstances is erroneous and that, alterna-
tively, federal courts should use AEDPA's standards of deferential review for
evidentiary matters in collateral proceedings that occur under the dual sover-
eignty exception.7 Thus, this Note asserts that the latest congressional state-
ment on the rule of comity with regard to evidentiary matters is AEDPA.'
This Note contends that the general congressional intent behind the passage
of AEDPA-that federal courts should review the actions of state courts
regarding evidentiary issues in the criminal context only in extremely limited
circumstances-is not confined to the habeas context.' Rather, Congress's
insistence that federal courts defer to state court evidentiary rulings can be
extended logically to evidentiary matters in collateral proceedings that occur
under the dual sovereignty exception."0
The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. The state and federal
criminal justice processes affect citizens in fundamental ways. These pro-
cesses not only restrict individual liberty, but also influence decisions of life
and death." In particular, the prohibition against double jeopardy is "funda-
6. See supra note 5 (describing cases under AEDPA in which federal courts applied dual
sovereignty doctrine to suppression rulings).
7. See infra Part VI (illustrating how federal courts could apply this Note's proposal).
8. See infra Part V (discussing legislative intent behind AEDPA).
9. See infra Part VI (arguing that rule of comity underlying AEDPA applies to other
collateral proceedings).
10. See infra Part VI (arguing that rule of comity underlying AEDPA applies to other
collateral proceedings).
11. The dual sovereignty exception does implicate capital crimes. United States v. Ealy,
163 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634 (W.D. Va. 2001). In Ealy, the Commonwealth of Virginia previously
prosecuted the defendant, Samuel Ealy, for murder. Commonwealth v. Ealy, 407 S.E.2d 681,
683 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). However, a Virginia circuit court suppressed evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds and the state trial resulted in an acquittal. Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
Nine years later, a federal grand jury indicted Ealy for various federal crimes based on the same
murders. Id. In August 2001, a federal district court denied Ealy's motion to suppress the same
evidence, rejecting arguments that it should consider the state court's earlier suppression ruling.
Id. at 634-35. In June 2002, after three days of deliberation, a federal jury convicted Ealy of
capital murder. Jen McCaffery & Laurence Hammack, Man Convicted in 1989 Killings,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, June 7, 2002, at B1. However, the jury rejected arguments
in favor of a death sentence, instead imposing a sentence of life in prison. Jen McCaffery, Ealy
Gets Life in Prison for Murders, Jury Spares Tazewell Man Death, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, June 12, 2002, at B1.
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mental to the American scheme of justice."' 2 It is an ideal so important to a
free, ordered, and just society that the Founders included it in the Bill of
Rights.
13
Because the Founders intended the Bill of Rights to protect individual
rights and liberties, successive prosecutions should be limited and narrowly
tailored to serve those societal interests that take precedence over the interests
of an individual. 4 However, successive prosecutions today are not so limited.
The rationale of the Supreme Court in its continuing adherence to the dual
sovereignty doctrine does not adequately explain the societal rights that take
precedence over the interests of the individual. 5 Given this inconsistency in
the doctrine's underpinnings, this Note's proposal would help to safeguard the
individual liberties that the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect. Concur-
rently, this proposal recognizes the federal government's role in protecting
society's interest in the enforcement of criminal laws and concedes that, in
cases in which the state court has acted truly irrationally, the federal govern-
ment should relitigate suppression rulings in the dual sovereignty context.' 6
This Note explores the effect of AEDPA on the dual sovereignty doctrine
as applied to suppression of evidence cases. Part II examines the origin and
development of the dual sovereignty doctrine.17 This Part illustrates how the
Supreme Court conceived of the doctrine under questionable precedent and
explores the aversion to the doctrine among legal scholars, practitioners, and
members of the judiciary. Part III surveys a cross-section of federal cases to
illustrate how courts apply the dual sovereignty doctrine in suppression of
evidence cases. 's This Part analyzes the rationale of courts which assert that
the principles of collateral estoppel do not apply to subsequent federal prosecu-
tions occurring under the dual sovereignty exception. Part IV examines the
writ of habeas corpus and its origin and explains how the history of the writ's
12. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969). The Benton Court went on to state
that "[tihe fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted."
Id.
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("lINor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
14. See Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement andDouble Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159,1161-62 (1995) (discussing intention
of Framers to protect individual rights and liberties through Bill of Rights).
15. See infra Part Il.C (discussing criticism of dual sovereignty doctrine).
16. See infra Part VI.B-C (arguing that federal government should relitigate evidentiary
issues in cases in which state court judgment was "unreasonable" or "contrary to" clearly
established federal law, thereby protecting societal interests of deterrence, retribution, and
restoration of public confidence).
17. See infra Part I (examining dual sovereignty doctrine).
18. See infra Part III (discussing dual sovereignty doctrine as applied to suppression
rulings).
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pleading and practice demonstrates that habeas proceedings are analogous to
other collateral proceedings, specifically those occurring under the dual
sovereignty doctrine. 9 Part V discusses AEDPA with a particular emphasis
on the legislative history and the current case law concerning the Act. 20 This
Part also includes a discussion of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence support-
ing increased deference to state court rulings. Part VI considers rules of comity
and illustrates how federal courts should apply this Note's proposal." This
Part concludes by addressing the potential criticisms of the proposal. This
Note closes by explaining why federal court deference to state courts in the
dual sovereignty context is essential to the protection of the individual liberties
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.22
II The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
The application of the dual sovereignty doctrine rests at the core of this
Note's analysis. In order to demonstrate how successive prosecutions occur,
this Part will examine the development of the dual sovereignty doctrine, as well
as its application in modem times. This Part will conclude by examining the
criticisms of the dual sovereignty doctrine-criticisms that underscore the need
for a deferential standard of review toward previous state court suppression
rulings23
A. The Historical Development of the Doctrine
The Supreme Court established the dual sovereignty exception to the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment in a 1922 case, United States
v. Lanza.24 In Lanza, the Court held that an act denounced as a crime by both
19. See infra Part IV (analogizing federal habeas proceedings to federal dual sovereignty
proceedings).
20. See infra Part V (examining AEDPA).
21. See infra Part VI (illustrating proposal for federal court review of state court suppres-
sion rulings in dual sovereignty context).
22. See infra Part VII (explaining importance of proposal to protection of individual
liberties).
23. See infra Part VI (proposing that federal courts should give deferential review to state
court suppression rulings in dual sovereignty context).
24. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). The Lanza case involved several
individuals whom the federal government charged with violating various provisions of the
National Prohibition Act. Id. at 378-79. The Court considered the defendant's claim that a
prior prosecution under a Washington state statute for the same conduct barred the federal
prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 379-80. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Taft found that each sovereign could enact laws to secure
prohibition because each sovereign derived its power from different sources and thus each could
deal with the same subject matter within the same territory. Id. at 382. The majority next stated
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national and state sovereigns is an offense against the peace and dignity of both
and that each sovereign can thus punish the act accordingly.25 Although the
Lanza Court noted that a long line of decisions by the Court supported this
view of the Fifth Amendment,2 6 today most scholars disagree with the Lanza
Court's analysis of the then relevant case law.27 The Lanza Court rationalized
its decision by noting in dictum that if the Court barred a federal prosecution
after a state prosecution, this prohibition would prompt a "race of offenders to
the courts of that State to plead guilty and secure immunity from federal
prosecution," especially in cases in which state penalties consist of small or
nominal fines.2
Although the existence of any empirical evidence supporting the Lanza
policy rationale is questionable,29 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and extended
the dual sovereignty exception in two cases during its 1959 Term: Bartkus v.
Illinois" and Abbate v. United States.31 The Bartkus Court upheld the state
that "[e]ach government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity
is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other." Id. The Court then held that a convic-
tion by a Washington state court of an act against that state was not a conviction of the same act
against the United States; thus, the subsequent prosecution by the federal government did not
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Id.
25. See id. at 382 (establishing dual sovereignty exception).
26. Id. The Lanza Court primarily relied on Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382. In Fox, the Court noted in dictum that, even if the federal and state
governments prohibited the same offense, each government had the independent right to
prosecute and punish a defendant for a violation of this offense. Fox, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 435.
Other pre-Civil War cases also mention the dual sovereignty doctrine in dicta. See Moore v.
Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19-20 (1852) (noting, in response to defendant's argument of
double jeopardy, that because same act produced two offenses, that act violated laws of two
sovereigns); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 567-68 (1850) (reaffirming in
dictum independent right of state and federal governments to prosecute same act when act
violates statute of each sovereign).
27. See Guerra, supra note 14, at 1202-03 (noting that it is odd that Lanza Court cited
Fox v. Ohio because Fox Court stated that successive prosecutions should occur only in
instances of peculiar enormity, and then questioning whether manufacturing liquor, Lanza's
offense, was crime of peculiar enormity); George. C. Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double
Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 CAsE W. REs. L.
REV. 700, 711 (1963) (stating that no clear and binding precedent forced Lanza Court to allow
successive prosecutions because English precedent seemed to disallow such successive
prosecutions and American precedent was contradictory and inconclusive).
28. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 385.
29. See J.A.C. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV.
1309, 1330-31 (1932) (noting that Lanza Court's argument that prohibition on successive
prosecutions would result in voluntary rush of offenders to more lenient court was unsup-
ported).
30. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). The Bartkus Court considered the issues of
whether a state prosecution was a sham and in fact a second federal prosecution in violation of
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court conviction of a defendant whose first federal trial based on the same
robbery resulted in an acquittal.32 In reaffirming the dual sovereignty doctrine,
Justice Frankfurter referred to previous cases involving the dual sovereignty
doctrine as "a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudica-
tion."33 In Abbate, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
protect a criminal defendant from a federal prosecution after a state conviction
for the same act.34 The Abbate Court declined to overrule Lanza, stating that,
"if the States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating their laws, and the
resultant state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts,
federal law enforcement must necessarily be hindered."35
B. Modem Development of the Doctrine
Two significant extensions of the dual sovereignty doctrine occurred in
the latter decades of the twentieth century. First, the Supreme Court extended
the Fifth Amendment, and whether the subsequent state prosecution violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 123-24. Bartkus's federal trial resulted in an
acquittal on National Bank Robbery Act charges, but an Illinois grand jury later indicted him
for violations of the Illinois Robbery Act. Id. His state trial then resulted in a conviction. Id.
at 122. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction. Id. at 123-24. On the first issue, the Court
stated that, although the activities of the federal and state prosecuting authorities showed a high
degree of cooperation, they did not establish that the county prosecutor was a mere agent of the
federal prosecutor. Id. The Court reasoned that the record established that state officials
undertook the prosecution within their discretionary authority and on the basis of evidence
revealing the occurrence of a violation of Illinois state law. Id. at 123. On the second issue, the
Court rejected the contention that the subsequent state prosecution violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and reasoned that the Fifth Amendment was not effective
against the states. Id. at 124-26. The Court cited Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19
(1852), and noted that, because the laws of two sovereigns were applicable, the same act
produced two offenses; therefore, the second prosecution did not put Bartkus twice in jeopardy
for the same offense. Bartkus, 359 U.S at 131-32.
31. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). In Abbate, the defendants previously
pleaded guilty in state court to conspiring to injure or destroy the property of another. Id. at
188. After the defendants received a three-month sentence, a federal grand jury indicted them,
and their federal court trial resulted in a conviction for violating the Federal Conspiracy Act.
Id. at 188-89. At issue was whether the subsequent federal prosecution violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 189. Relying on Lanza and Bartkus, the
Abbate Court determined that the federal conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
and thus upheld the conviction. Id. at 189-95. The Court reasoned that "unless the federal
authorities could somehow insure that there would be no state prosecutions for particular acts
that also constitute federal offenses, the efficiency of federal law enforcement must suffer if the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents successive state and federal prosecutions." Id. at 195.
32. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 138.
33. Id. at 136.
34. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 196.
35. Id. at 195.
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the doctrine to authorize subsequent prosecutions by an Indian tribe and by the
federal government. 6 Second, the Court held that separate states may prose-
cute a defendant for the same act." In so doing, the Court noted that it "ha[d]
plainly and repeatedly stated that two identical offenses are not the same
offense within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause if they are prose-
cuted by different sovereigns.""'
Currently, the dual sovereignty doctrine is limited in only three areas.39
First, under the Petite Policy, adopted by the United States Department of
Justice in 1959, the United States voluntarily abstains from bringing a federal
action following a state prosecution unless the reasons for the federal prosecu-
tion are "compelling" and the appropriate Assistant Attorney General grants
authorization.40 However, the policy is not law, nor is it judicially
enforceable,4 and successive prosecutions, although rare, continue to occur
despite the policy.42 Second, many states have statutes or constitutional
provisions that prohibit a state prosecution following a federal prosecution for
the same conduct or offense.43 Finally, the doctrine is limited by the sham
36. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978) (concluding that when
Navajo tribe exercises power to punish offenses against tribal laws committed by tribe members,
"it does so as part of its retained sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Government").
37. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (noting that dual sovereignty doctrine,
as originally articulated and consistently applied by Court, compels conclusion that Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions by two states for same conduct).
38. Id. at 92.
39. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (noting limitations).
40. See United States v. Valenzuela, 584 F.2d 374, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1978) (recounting
history of Petite Policy, which was named after Supreme Court case of Petite v. United States,
361 U.S. 529 (1960)). The United States Department of Justice incorporated this policy into
the United States Attorneys' Manual. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AroRNEYs'
MANUAL § 9-2.031 (1999) (outlining guidelines for exercise of discretion by Department of
Justice in determining whether to bring federal prosecution based on "substantially the same
act(s) or transactions involved in a prior state or federal proceeding"), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.031 (last
visited Jan. 6, 2003).
41. See United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that court
has consistently recognized dual sovereignty rule by holding that defendant is not entitled to
dismissal of indictment even if Government does not comply with Petite Policy); United States
v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that Petite Policy provides no basis for
substantive relief); United States v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1991) (same).
42. See Guerra, supra note 14, at 1207-09 nn.245-46 (listing numerous cases of succes-
sive federal-state and state-federal prosecutions).
43. See Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 383,404 n.150 (1986) (listing such state statutes); Michael
A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine,
102 YALE L.J. 281,294 (1992) (noting that, as of 1992, twenty-three states had statutes limiting
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exception." The Bartkus Court suggested the sham exception when it noted
that the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar successive prosecutions in cases
in which "the state prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecu-
tion, and thereby in essential fact another federal prosecution."4 Relying upon
this language, several courts have recognized the exception. 6 Yet, like the
other limitations to the dual sovereignty doctrine, courts construe the sham
exception very narrowly.47 Significant cooperation between state and federal
authorities does not provide a basis for applying the exception. 8 Nor does the
cross-designation of a state district attorney as a federal official to assist or to
conduct a federal prosecution satisfy the exception.49
C. Rationale and Criticism of the Doctrine
The Supreme Court has upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine based on its
concern that elimination of the doctrine would undermine federalism by
jeopardizing the distinct relationship between the federal and state govern-
ments.5" The most widely cited rationale for the dual sovereignty doctrine is
dual sovereignty doctrine).
44. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959) (suggesting sham exception).
45. Id.
46. See United States v. G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483,494 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing
and defining Bartkus exception); United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832-34 (2d Cir. 1990)
(same); United States v. Guy, 903 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v.
Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906,910 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
47. See United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he 'sham
prosecution' exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine, if it exists at all, is a narrow one, an
extremely narrow one. Cases of this Court dealing with claims of 'sham prosecutions' have
recognized this: We have uniformly rejected such claims. Other circuits have done likewise.").
48. See G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d at 495 (stating that significant cooperation does not
fall under exception); United States v. Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that Bartkus
exception clearly does not bar cooperation between prosecuting authorities).
49. See G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d at 495 (explaining that cross-designation of attorneys
does not fall under exception); see also United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1019
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding that designation of state prosecutor as Special Assistant to United States
Attorney was not significant); United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 893 (4th Cir. 1988) (same).
But cf. United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 671 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding that cross-
designation of state attorney who conducted initial state trial amounted to "breakdown in
federalism," and thus subsequent federal prosecution was "simply 'a sham and a cover' for the
first"), requestfor modification denied, 769 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Va. 1991). Although the court
ultimately decided the case on other grounds, the Belcher court appears to be the only court to
find a sham prosecution. Id. However, courts should limit the Belcher case to its very unusual
factual circumstances.
50. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985) (explaining that dual sovereignty
exception finds weighty support in historical understanding and political realities of states' role
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the argument that federalism requires each government to have the right to
prosecute accused criminals within its jurisdiction because a single act is an
offense against the peace and dignity of both the federal and state govern-
ments.5 This argument considers the possibility that one sovereign may negate
the ability of the other to punish the wrongdoer adequately, 2 the concern that
if courts prohibit successive prosecutions, an unseemly competition among
states in the prosecution of offenses will result," and the belief that one sover-
eign's prosecution cannot vindicate another sovereign's interest in the enforce-
ment of its own laws.54
Although firmly established in American jurisprudence,5 the dual sover-
eignty doctrine is certainly not without its criticisms. The most frequently
cited and forceful argument against the exception is that it violates the spirit
and the letter of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.56 This
view has ample support. First, the history of the Fifth Amendment shows that
the Framers rejected such an exception.57 Second, the spirit of the Double
in federal system); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959) (noting that to displace
reserved power of states over state offenses by reason of prosecution of federal offenses would
derogate federal system); see also Evan Tsen Lee, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double
Jeopardy: In the Wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 22 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 31, 31 (1987) (noting that putative justification for dual sovereignty exception is
federalism); Murchison, supra note 43, at 403 (discussing influence of Supreme Court's concern
over federalism in shaping dual sovereignty doctrine).
51. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 88 (noting that dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on
common law conception of crime as offense against sovereignty of government and that when
defendant violates peace and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking laws of each, defendant
commits two distinct offenses); Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131-32 (same); United States v. Lanza,
260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (same).
52. See United States v. G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 497 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi,
J., concurring) (discussing rationales for continuing vitality of dual sovereignty doctrine).
53. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 93 (stating that to deny State power to enforce its criminal
laws because another State wins race to courthouse "would be a shocking and untoward
deprivation of the historic right and obligations of the States to maintain peace and order within
their confines" (quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137)).
54. See id. (noting that "[a] State's interest in vindicating its sovereign authority through
enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by another State's enforcement of
its own laws").
55. See Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive
Prosecutions in theAge of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRiM. L. 1,15 (1992) (stating that
"[olne can no longer credibly question whether the rule permitting successive federal-state
prosecutions has been 'firmly established"').
56. Guerra, supra note 14, at 1161-62.
57. See Ronald J. Allen & John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of
Doctrine andRationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801,816 (1985)
(noting that best evidence of Framers' intent shows that they did not intend exception for
separate federal and state prosecutions of same act); see also Christina 0. Woods, Comment,
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Jeopardy clause, as captured by Justice Black's famous language, guarantees
that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. s
Clearly, successive prosecutions undermine this spirit of the Double Jeopardy
Clause by subjecting individuals to the harassment, embarrassment, and
expense of reprosecutions.59 Similarly, the doctrine is susceptible to criticism
regarding the nature of the double jeopardy protection itself. Courts have
described the nature of the double jeopardy protection as an "intrinsically
personal" protection.' Thus, to eliminate such a protection in the name of
sovereignty is especially difficult to justify given that the interests the Double
Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect are those of individuals, not of a sovereign or
even the people of that sovereign.61 Furthermore, because the purpose of the
Bill of Rights is to restrict a sovereign's power through placing limits on
government, to allow courts to diminish an essential element of the Bill of
Rights in the name of sovereignty is to compromise the integrity of the Consti-
tution.62
That the Supreme Court invokes federalism concerns to support the dual
sovereignty doctrine is also arguably inconsistent with the Court's decisions
that reject dual federalism for a more functional view of the allocation of
powers between state and federal governments.63 Critics point to decisions of
The Dual Sovereignly Exception to Double Jeopardy: An Unnecessary Loophole, 24 U. BALT.
L. REv. 177, 179-80 (1994) (arguing that failure of passage of proposed addendum to Bill of
Rights that would have added words "by any law of the United States" to conclusion of Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause strengthens argument that Fifth Amendment bars
successive trials between any jurisdiction).
58. United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
59. See Guerra, supra note 14, at 1210 (explaining that Double Jeopardy Clause is not
mere technicality).
60. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447 (1989).
61. See United States v. G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483,498 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi,
J., concurring) ("[lt is hard to justify limiting the reach of the Bill of Rights ... on no stronger
grounds ... [than] the interests of the sovereigns involved.").
62. See Grant, supra note 29, at 1329 ("By very definition, the purpose of a bill of rights
is to restrict sovereignty through placing limitations upon an otherwise legally omnipotent
government.").
63. See Lee, supra note 50, at 52 (arguing that, because several modem Supreme Court
decisions challenge substantive federalism, courts should begin thinking earnestly about future
of dual sovereignty exception); Robert Matz, Note, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy
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the Court that have made the Double Jeopardy Clause binding on the states."
Likewise, the reasoning of the Court in incorporating the Fourth Amend-
ment's protections against illegal searches and seizures to the states,6 and in
incorporating the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination to
the states,' 6 illustrates this changing view of the nature of federalism. The
dramatic changes in the relationship between the federal and state govern-
ments since the development of the doctrine also undermine the Supreme
Court's rationale for upholding the dual sovereignty exception based on
concerns over federalism.67 In recent years, Congress has enormously en-
larged the scope of federal criminal law, and cooperation between federal and
state authorities in investigating and prosecuting crimes is now common.6"
Governments that cooperate with one another to solve the problems of a
common constituency are thus not separate sovereigns in any sense.69
Finally, critics argue that whereas federalism's original purpose was the
promotion of individual liberty and human freedom, the dual sovereignty
doctrine frustrates those policies by allowing successive prosecutions.7" They
argue that a single prosecution of a single crime serves the interests and justifi-
cations of criminal law, such as deterrence, retribution, and restoration of the
Clause: IfAt First You Don't Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L. 353, 370-71
(1997) (outlining Supreme Court decisions that undercut dual sovereignty doctrine).
64. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (finding that retrial of defendant
by State of Maryland for larceny, after previous state court trial resulted in acquittal for same
crime, violated constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy).
65. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of Constitution is inadmissible in state court).
66. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed petitioner protection of Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination); see
also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-79 (1964) (finding separate sovereignty
theory of self-incrimination historically unfounded). Thus, the Murphy Court held that the
privilege against self-incrimination protected a state witness against incrimination under federal
and state law, as well as a federal witness against incrimination under federal and state law. Id.
67. See Braun, supra note 55, at 9 (arguing that as laws increase incidence of successive
prosecutions, manner in which law enforcement officials enforce laws demonstrates correspond-
ing need to re-examine rule and rationale of dual sovereignty doctrine).
68. See United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 831 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that cooperation
between federal and local agencies in area of law enforcement has become increasingly
important and commonplace); see also Guerra, supra note 14, at 1163 (stating that "the creation
of a massive, federally-operated criminal justice system turns the theory of our federalist system
on its head").
69. See Guerra, supra note 14, at 1159 (arguing that, at least in field of law enforcement,
nation is no longer one of separate sovereigns).
70. See Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 57, at 823 (arguing that Heath Court's justifica-
tion for dual sovereignty is erroneous because state and federal governments protect same
interest).
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public confidence, just as well as successive prosecutions." In fact, these
critics point out that "[t]he only interests which cannot be served by a prior
prosecution in another's state courts are the desire to inflict upon an individual
the very multiple trials and punishments which the double jeopardy clause was
meant to bar, and the desire to be the actual agent of punishment."'72 This
criticism is especially poignant in light of the most notorious uses of the dual
sovereignty exception73-cases that, while politically popular, reinforce the
idea that the Constitution should not be abridged to placate public discontent."
To,-give the prosecution "a second bite at the apple" in such emotionally
charged contexts undermines the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause by
increasing the possibility that a defendant, though innocent, will nevertheless
be found guilty."
III The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and Suppression Rulings
Despite the foregoing criticisms, the dual sovereignty doctrine appears to
be an enduring component of the criminal justice system.76 The particular
application of the doctrine in suppression of evidence proceedings implicates
various other considerations important to this Note. To fully appreciate how
courts use the doctrine, a brief explanation of exclusionary devices, as well as
the jurisprudence concerning the dual sovereignty doctrine as applied to
suppression of evidence cases, is necessary.
A. State Versus Federal Exclusionary Devices
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution is inadmissible in both federal and state courts under the
exclusionary rule.77 In a federal prosecution, federal law determines whether
71. See id. (noting various justifications of criminal law).
72. Id.
73. See United States v. G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483,499 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi,
J., concurring) (discussing recent notable examples of federal-state prosecutions, such as federal
prosecution after state jury acquitted police officers accused of using excessive force on Rodney
King, and federal prosecution after state jury acquitted African American youth of murdering
Hasidic Jew).
74. See Matz, supra note 63, at 373 ("Admittedly, when our system of justice apparently
fails us, it is often both desirable and reassuring when the federal government vindicates the
interests of society. However, as the Supreme Court has held in other contexts, protections
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be abridged in order to mollify public disquiet.").
75. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing spirit of Double Jeopardy
Clause).
76. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining endurance of dual sovereignty
doctrine).
77. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by
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suppression of evidence is appropriate under the Fourth Amendment regardless
of whether state or federal officials seized the evidence."8 However, because
many states' constitutions and laws offer protections greater than those under
the Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained in accordance with the Fourth
Amendment may still violate state law.79 Thus, when a federal court considers
the suppression of evidence under federal law, it may allow the admission of
evidence that violates a particular state's constitutional protections but does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.80 Given this scheme, when reviewing a
state proceeding, federal courts may have difficulty in differentiating whether
the state court suppressed evidence on federal or state exclusionary grounds."'
Until the 1960 case of Elkins v. United States, 2 the federal government
searches and seizures in violation of Constitution is inadmissible in state court). Thus, if law
enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment during a search or seizure and a prosecutor
subsequently offers the fruits of that violation against a defendant, a court may suppress the
evidence from use in the defendant's criminal trial. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.1 (3d ed. 1996) (describing remedy
for Fourth Amendment violations).
78. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964) (noting that courts must
consider evidence obtained by state officers and used against defendant in federal trial as if
federal officers made search and seizure); United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.
1977) (noting that because case was federal prosecution, federal law determines whether
suppression is appropriate).
79. See LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 1.5(a) (noting that, while particular search or seizure
may not offend United States Constitution, search or seizure may be unlawful or illegal per state
constitutional provision or statute).
80. Id.
81. See id. (describing difficulty in distinguishing between these two exclusionary
grounds). The Supreme Court clarified these situations in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), by establishing a standard by which federal courts can determine if a state court decided
a case on an "adequate and independent state ground" or on a federal constitutional ground. Id.
at 1040-41. The difficulty of this distinction is important to this Note because this Note
considers only those cases in which a state court clearly suppressed evidence on federal
constitutional grounds.
82. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Elkins Court addressed the issue
of whether federal prosecutors could introduce articles obtained from an unreasonable search
and seizure by state officers-without the involvement of federal officers-against the defen-
dant in a federal criminal trial. Id. at 208. Prior to the defendant's federal trial, the defendant
made a motion to suppress evidence originally seized by state law enforcement officers. Id. at
206-08. At the suppression hearing, the district court judge assumed, without deciding, that
the state officers obtained the articles in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but denied the
motion because no agent of the United States participated in the illegal search. Id. at 207. In
its analysis, the Supreme Court considered the case of Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
in which it had held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by state officers, but found that this alone did not require federal courts to adopt the
exclusionary rule with respect to evidence illegally seized by state agents. Elkins, 354 U.S. at
213-14. In light of the underlying constitutional doctrine established by Wolf, the Court stated
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could avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating
independently of federal officers even though, had federal officials participated
in the search, a court would have excluded such evidence under the Fourth
Amendment."3 The premise of the practice, called the "silver platter doctrine,"
was that the federal government could use the fruits of a search conducted by
state officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment as if the state authorities
had turned over the evidence they secured to the federal authorities on a silver
platter.84 However, the Elkins Court found this doctrine inconsistent with the
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. 5 Accordingly, the Elkins Court
held that evidence obtained by state officials during a search that would have
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights if federal officers had
conducted the search was inadmissible in a federal proceeding. 6 The demise
of the silver platter doctrine demonstrates that, although federal courts at one
time could allow the introduction of evidence that a state official obtained
illegally, a violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by either
sovereign is presently prohibited.
B. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine as Applied to Suppression Rulings
The sound rejection of the silver platter doctrine is key to understanding
the inherent incongruity in applying the dual sovereignty doctrine to suppres-
sion of evidence cases. First, when a state court considers a suppression issue,
the Fourth Amendment binds the state court just as it does a federal court.8 7
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment binds both state and federal law enforcement
officers who conduct searches and seizures. 8 However, when a state court
suppresses evidence on federal constitutional grounds, a federal court may
allow introduction of the evidence in a collateral proceeding that occurs under
that the foundation of the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to state officers had disap-
peared. Id. at 213. Thus, the Court concluded that evidence obtained by state officers in
violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in the defendant's federal trial, noting that
"[t]o the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal
agent or by a state officer." Id. at 215.
83. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (noting certainty of federal
government's right to avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating
entirely upon own account).
84. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949).
85. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223 (overruling silver platter doctrine).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining that evidence obtained in
violation of Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state court).
88. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing demise of silver platter
doctrine).
THE NEED FOR COMITY
the dual sovereignty exception without considering the state court's earlier
suppression ruling. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted this
very scenario in United States v. Safari." In Safari, the Commonwealth of
Virginia charged Safari with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, but
a state court later suppressed items seized from Safari's residence on the
ground that the search warrant was invalid.9" The Commonwealth subse-
quently dropped the charges against Safari, but then a federal grand jury
indicted Safari on drug-related violations stemming from the same transaction
alleged in the state court charges.' Following his conviction, Safari appealed,
contending that the district court erred by failing to apply the principles of
collateral estoppel to his pretrial motion to suppress.93 The Safari court
rejected the defendant's contention and held that collateral estoppel did not
apply because the federal government was not a party to the state court
action.94 The court held that even though the federal government appointed
the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney from Safari's state case as a Special
Assistant United States Attorney for prosecution of Safari's federal case, the
appointment was subsequent to the state court action, and thus that executive
branch function did not retroactively make the federal government a party to
the earlier state proceeding.95
The Safari court did not fully explore why the dual sovereignty doctrine,
coupled with principles of collateral estoppel, would prevent federal judges
from considering a state court suppression ruling as binding on the federal
collateral proceeding. Yet courts considering factual scenarios similar to
89. See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text (outlining court decisions that allow
introduction of such evidence).
90. United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1988).
91. Id. at 892-93.
92. Id. at 893.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Safari Court relied on United States v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1977),
in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a prior state court
ruling to suppress did not foreclose a federal prosecution arising from the same facts. Safari,
849 F.2d at 893 (citing Mejias, 552 F.2d at 441). The Mejias court cited previous Second
Circuit decisions finding that a prior adverse suppression issue in state court does not collater-
ally estop the United States, which was not a party to the state action, from using the evidence
in a federal proceeding. Mejias, 552 F.2d at 444. The Court also noted that "[w]hen the success
of the state prosecution was seriously jeopardized by the state court suppression ruling ... it
became the clear duty of the federal authorities to proceed against the individuals involved .... "
Id. at 441.
95. Safari, 849 F.2d at 893.
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Safari follow that court's rationale.96 In United States v. Davis,97 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explored the circumstances in
which cooperation between federal and state law enforcement operations
becomes so close that the federal government should be bound by a state
court's suppression ruling. 9 After discussing the origin and purpose of the
dual sovereignty doctrine, the Davis court stated that, for reasons analogous to
the rationale of the dual sovereignty doctrine, suppression of evidence in a state
prosecution normally does not prevent the United States from using that
evidence in a federal proceeding.' Like the Safari court, the Davis court
reasoned that, because the United States was not a party to the state action, was
not present during the suppression hearing, and had no way of making its views
known to the state judge, it could not fairly be considered to have had its day
in court."re The Davis court then concluded that "[blecause the two prosecu-
tions [were] independent, 'one sovereign should not be bound by the evidence
or the strategy of the other."'10' The Davis court considered it firmly estab-
lished "that 'collateral estoppel never bars the United States from using evi-
dence previously suppressed in a state proceeding in which the United States
was not a party,""'  yet it left open the possibility that under some circum-
96. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text (discussing case law that follows
Safari rationale).
97. United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1990). In Davis, the court considered
the issue of whether the suppression of evidence by a state court required the suppression of that
same evidence in a later federal prosecution against the same defendants. Id. A district court
granted the defendants' motion to suppress evidence, which a state court had previously
suppressed, on collateral estoppel grounds. Id. at 831-32. However, the Second Circuit
disagreed with the district court's ruling and reasoned that, because different sovereigns were
involved in the previous and subsequent prosecutions, collateral estoppel did not apply. Id. at
832. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the relationship between the federal and
state prosecutors was so close that it placed the federal government in privity with the state
prosecution. Id. at 833-34. The court noted that the task force who arrested the defendant was
comprised of both federal and state officers. Id. at 834. But the court stated that, because the
task force officers did not file the charges or otherwise control the prosecutions, their status as
federal agents was not determinative of the privity issue. Id. The Davis court left open the
question concerning what level of participation a court would require before it would recognize
privity and apply collateral estoppel; however, the court noted that "[alt a minimum, it must be
shown that federal prosecutors actively aided the state prosecutors during the local suppression
hearing. Only then can it be said that their interests in enforcing federal law were sufficiently
represented." Id. at 835.
98. See id. at 831 (discussing circumstances in which federal government is bound by
state court determination).
99. Id. at 832.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 404 F. Supp. 273, 275 (W.D. Tex. 1974)).
102. Id. (quoting United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447,456 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also
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stances the United States could be in privity with a party in the prior proceed-
ing; therefore, principles of collateral estoppel could apply." 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit further
considered these circumstances in United States v. Perchitti.'0 In Perchitti,
the court stated that an open question existed as to whether issue preclusion
applied in the criminal context that would bar one governmental entity from
relitigating a pretrial suppression order previously rendered against another
governmental entity."' 5 Finding no need to decide the applicability of issue
preclusion to successive criminal prosecutions by multiple sovereigns because
United States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that state court suppression
ruling does not collaterally estop federal government from using wiretap evidence in subsequent
federal prosecution because courts have firmly established that ruling in state prosecution will
collaterally estop federal government only if federal authorities substantially controlled state
action or if state court prosecutor virtually represented federal government). In Charles, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit went on to state that it joined the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits in holding that the appointment of a state prosecutor as a special federal
prosecutor, subsequent to the state court action, does not retroactively make the federal
government a party to an earlier state court proceeding. Id.; United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d
7, 12 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting, in context of previous state court suppression ruling, that defendant
generally may not invoke criminal collateral estoppel against one sovereign on basis of ruling
in prosecution brought by different sovereign); United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1209 (6th
Cir. 1993) (stating that prior adverse suppression decision in state court simply does not
preclude federal government, which was not party to state action, from using evidence in federal
proceeding); United States v. Culbreath, Nos. 89-5590, 89-6004, 1990 WL 148420, at *2 (4th
Cir. Oct. 9, 1990) (per curiam) (holding that state court finding of unconstitutionality of search
is not binding on district court and that collateral estoppel does not preclude district court from
reviewing constitutionality of search de novo); United States v. Beigel, 370 F.2d 751, 755 (2d
Cir. 1967) (noting that principles of collateral estoppel do not bar federal government from
using evidence suppressed by state court because United States was not party to state proceed-
ing); United States v. Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (W.D. Va. 2001) (finding that federal
court was not bound by principles of res judicata or comity to follow earlier decision by state
court to exclude evidence).
103. See United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 835 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that, at mini-
mum, defendant must show federal involvement in state suppression hearing). For an interest-
ing discussion concerning the circumstances in which the United States could be in privity with
a state in these contexts, see Londono-Rivera v. Virginia, 155 F. Supp. 2d 551, 564-68 (E.D.
Va. 2001).
104. United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674 (1 1th Cir. 1992). At issue in Perchitti was
whether the district court erred in failing to apply issue preclusion to the defendant's motion to
suppress because a state judge suppressed the same evidence in a previous state action for the
same conduct. Id. After applying the traditional privity tests, including the presence of multiple
sovereigns, the court found that the level of cooperation between federal and state officials did
not establish privity between the state and federal government and thus issue preclusion did not
apply. Id. at 676-77.
105. See id. at 675 (noting that First and Fourth Circuits recognize that issue preclusion
may apply in criminal context).
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no privity existed between Florida and the United States, the court did little to
answer this question.'" The court recounted a number of traditional consider-
ations relevant to determining privity, but concluded that the Supreme Court's
establishment of the dual sovereignty exception for double jeopardy offered the




Case law firmly supports the reasoning that collateral estoppel does not
apply when different sovereigns, and thus different parties, are involved in the
litigation.' 8 Courts primarily support this rationale by pointing to the tradi-
tional principles of collateral estoppel and the endurance of the dual sover-
eignty concept."° Thus, when a federal court under the dual sovereignty
exception considers evidence that a state court previously suppressed on
federal constitutional grounds, it considers the evidence anew. A defendant
who succeeded in suppressing evidence during a state proceeding must
relitigate this issue in federal court. Many of the criticisms of the dual sover-
eignty exception are applicable to these situations because subjecting an
individual to the expense, ordeal, and anxiety of relitigating the admission of
evidence undermines the purpose and spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause."0
Therefore, this Note will implicate these situations-situations that, though
perfectly legal, are nevertheless so similar to collateral habeas proceedings that
recent congressional action concerning habeas should weigh heavily on federal
courts' actions.
IV Analogizing Federal Habeas Proceedings to Federal
Dual Sovereignty Proceedings
A necessary assumption to applying this Note's proposal is that habeas
corpus proceedings are analogous to collateral proceedings that occur under
the dual sovereignty exception. Several potential problems challenge this
assumption. First, the parties to a federal proceeding that follows a state
106. Id. at 676.
107. See id. (noting that, when parties at issue are sovereigns, Supreme Court's teaching
in double jeopardy context provides additional guidance for privity inquiry).
108. See supra notes 90-107 and accompanying text (discussing applicable case law); see
also United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 890 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that doctrine of
collateral estoppel was inapplicable to prosecution by dual sovereigns).
109. See Ricks, 882 F.2d at 890 (noting that inapplicability of collateral estoppel flows
from Supreme Court's definition of collateral estoppel and from Court's continuing endorse-
ment of dual sovereignty doctrine in related contexts).
110. See supra Part IU.C (discussing criticism of dual sovereignty doctrine).
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proceeding in the dual sovereignty context are different from the parties to a
federal proceeding that follows a state proceeding in the habeas context. In
the dual sovereignty context, the parties are the federal government and the
defendant. In the habeas context, the parties are the petitioner for a writ of
habeas corpus (the defendant in the state prosecution) and usually the warden
of the prison where the state government holds the petitioner."' Second,
successive federal prosecutions that occur under dual sovereignty are not
normally considered collateral to the previous state prosecution. This section
addresses these problems by explaining why the parties in a federal habeas
proceeding are analogous to the parties in a federal dual sovereignty proceed-
ing and why a successive federal prosecution under dual sovereignty is
collateral to the previous state prosecution.
A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
Before delving into the intricacies of party identity, a brief history of the
function and origin of the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The history of
habeas corpus is important to understanding this Note's proposal for two
reasons. First, it helps to place the discussion of party identity in the proper
historical context." 2 Second, it demonstrates that, at its core, habeas corpus
in the United States is about federalism.'
3
1. The General Function and Origin of the Writ
Translated literally, "habeas corpus" means "you have the body."'" 4 The
primary function of the "Great Writ of Liberty" is to release a person from
unlawful imprisonment-it serves to ensure the integrity of the process
resulting in imprisonment." 5 The purpose of the writ, then, is not to deter-
11. See DONALDE.WILKES, JR.,FEDERALPOSTCONVICTroNREMEDIES AND REuEF § 8-38
(1996) (noting that when state incarcerates petitioner in state prison facility, usual procedure
is to name as respondent either warden of institution where state is incarcerating prisoner or
chief officer in charge of state penal institutions).
112. See infra Part IV.A.2 (demonstrating how ex rel form derives from prerogative nature
of writ of habeas corpus).
113. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing close relation of habeas corpus
to notions of federalism in United States).
114. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 715(7th ed. 1999).
115. See WullAmF. DuKER, A CONSTTrUIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CoRPus 3 (1980)
(describing purpose of habeas corpus); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CoRPus: RETHINKING THE
GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 1 (2001) (noting that "habeas corpus is universally known and
celebrated as the 'Great Writ of Liberty"').
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mine a prisoner's guilt or innocence, but rather to determine whether the state
has denied the prisoner's liberty in violation of federal law.
n6
The writ originated in England as a device for compelling appearance
before the King's judicial instrumentalities." 7 Although the date of the writ's
origin is unknown, it was in use before the Magna Carta and was firmly
established in England by the end of the thirteenth century. 11s All thirteen
American colonies recognized the common law writ of habeas corpus." 19
However, scholars and jurists have debated the circumstances under which the
writ evolved in the United States into its present form. 2 ° The United States
Constitution mentions habeas corpus,' but whether this reference is to state
or federal habeas remedies is unclear.'22
116. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,401-02 (1963) (discussing purpose and history of writ
of habeas corpus), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
117. See DUKER, supra note 115, at 62 (discussing English origins of writ of habeas
corpus).
118. See CHEsERJ.ANTIEAU, THEPRACTICEOFEXTRAORDNARYREMEDIEs § 1.00(1987)
(describing history of habeas corpus). The courts of England used habeas corpus as a means
to increase and safeguard their jurisdictions from the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries.
See DUKER, supra note 115, at 62 (discussing English origins of writ of habeas corpus). Later,
when Parliament fought to restrain the Crown's powers to imprison, the executive and judicial
branches of England employed the writ in their battle for jurisdiction. Id. at 62-63. Thus, the
idea that habeas corpus originated primarily to protect a subject from illegal imprisonment is
largely a myth. Id. at 13. Scholars note that "the unconscious forces of constitutional law
crystallized the basic function of the writ as we know it today." Id. at 62.
119. See DUKER, supra note 115, at 115 (discussing history of writ of habeas corpus in
America).
120. See Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 888, 928 (1998) (noting that scholars have vehemently debated and
voluminously written about history of habeas corpus).
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.").
122. Compare DUKER, supra note 115, at 155 (arguing that habeas clause in Constitution
was meant to restrict Congress from suspending state habeas) with Developments in the Law:
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1267 (1970) (arguing that clause was meant
to protect federal prisoners). In either case, the Judiciary Act of 1789 made the writ available
only to federal prisoners. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (conferring upon courts of United States power to issue writ
of habeas corpus). However, in the aftermath of the Civil War, primarily out of a concern for
the protection of African American citizens, Congress extended the writ to state prisoners. See
Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution: A New Role For State Courts?, 27 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 297, 300 (1996) (noting extension of writ in 1867). In granting the writ, courts
continued to adhere to the traditional view of federal habeas review that limited the court's
consideration to issues involving the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Id.
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Despite this early uncertainty, by the 1950s federal habeas emerged as an
opportunity for full relitigation of federal constitutional claims arising from
state criminal prosecutions.123 By the early 1970s, federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners "had become the principal instrument for assuring that state
criminal proceedings were conducted in accordance with federal constitu-
tional requirements," thus evincing "the transcendental, overriding importance
of federal rights."'24 However, since this expansion, the federal courts and
Congress have retrenched federal habeas relief for state prisoners, and such
relief has become entangled in a maze of substantive and procedural restric-
tions. 2 A key aspect of this retrenchment has been the insistence of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts that federal courts respect the proper place of
state courts in the federal system.
126
The important point underlying this brief sketch of habeas corpus history
is that "[t]hroughout this century in the United States, habeas corpus has been
the medium of the dialogue of federalism between the federal and state
courts. ''127 In few other areas has the tension in the balance of power between
the federal and state governments been more apparent. This history helps
demonstrate why habeas is such an appropriate vehicle for studying congres-
sional views on federalism.
2. The Pleading and Practice of the Writ
As noted, in order to apply the congressional intent behind recent habeas
reforms to other collateral proceedings, the proceedings in the habeas corpus
context must be analogous to the proceedings in the dual sovereignty context.
Although the United States, as sovereign, is implicated in a federal prosecu-
tion following a state prosecution in the dual sovereignty context, the United
States, as sovereign, is not considered a party to a federal habeas action in
123. Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1703,1725(2000) (explain-
ing expansion of federal habeas for state prisoners in conjunction with Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953)).
124. WIuCES, supra note 11, § 3.2 (1996).
125. See Baird, supra note 122, at 305-11 (noting cases that have increased restrictions
on habeas corpus), see also WIXE, supra note 111, § 3-2 (noting that "since around 1972...
the United States Supreme Court has been engaged in an assiduous effort to restrict the
availability of federal habeas corpus relief [for state convicts]" (quoting Peter W. Tague,
Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has
Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1,4 (1978))).
126. See WILCES, supra note 111, § 3-2 (discussing Burger-Rehnquist Courts' narrow view
of fact-finding power of federal habeas courts).
127. DUKER, supra note 115, at 156; see also FREDMAN, supra note 115, at I (noting that
federal habeas corpus is closely linked to federalism).
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which a state prisoner challenges the state detention. 2 " However, a strong
argument can be made regarding the ex rel. form of pleading that courts
historically used in some habeas proceedings and that is still in use today.
Ex rel. is an abbreviation for the Latin word ex relationale, meaning
"upon being related" or "upon information."'29  Several federal courts of
appeals and state courts employ the phrase in the caption of habeas corpus
pleadings. 3 ' The real import of the use of the ex rel. form for this Note is its
connection with the sovereign power of the government. According to
Black's Law Dictionary, the ex rel. form is used "in the title of a legal pro-
ceeding filed by a state Attorney General (or the federal Department of
Justice) on behalf of the government, on the instigation of a private person,
who needs the state to enforce the rights of himself/herself and the public."''
The private person in such a suit is called the relator.3 ' Thus, when a case
128. See United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1988), for an example of a dual
sovereignty proceeding brought on behalf of the United States.
129. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 603 (7th ed. 1999). A similar translation of the phrase is
"from the information given by." ORAN's DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 156 (2d ed. 1991).
130. See, e.g., Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); United States ex
rel. Salisbury v. Blackburn, 792 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Roche v. Scully,
739 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1984); United States ax rel. Shepherd v. Wyrick, 675 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.
1982); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex
rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955). From my own research, the Seventh
Circuit uses the ex rel. form in habeas corpus proceedings most frequently, followed by the
Second and Third Circuits. I found isolated uses of the form in all federal circuits. Several
states also use this ex rel. form in their habeas proceedings. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hill v.
McOinnis, 587 N.E.2d 44 (11. App. Ct. 1992); State ex rel. Parsons v. Bushong, 109 N.E.2d
692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945); Commonwealth ex rel. Kelly v. Superintendent of House of Corr.,
22 Pa. D. 92 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1912); People ex rel. Meeker v. Baker, 127 N.Y.S. 382 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1911). Illinois and New York use the ex rel. form most commonly in their state
habeas proceedings. I could not locate an explanation for why some states and circuits use the
form and others do not. The practice originated in England and presently habeas corpus is the
only prerogative writ still in existence there. See WKEs, supra note 111, § 2-2 (noting
continuing use of prerogative writ in England).
131. BLACK'sLAwDICTIONARY603(7thed. 1999).
132. Id. at 1292 (defining relator as "1. The real party in interest in whose name a state or
an attorney general brings a lawsuit .... 2. The applicant for a writ .... 3. A person who
furnishes information on which a civil or criminal case is based"). Several other sources
provide definitions that are of assistance in sorting out the history of this form. See ORAN'S
DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 361 (2d ed. 1991) ("A person in whose name a state brings a legal
action (the person who 'relates' the facts on which the action is based)."); A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 470 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 1987) ("Relator is the legal term meaning
'a private person at whose relation or in whose behalf an application for a (writ) is filed."'); 2
BouvIER's LAW DICTIONARY 424 (2d ed. 1843) ("[1]nformations are allowed to be filed by
private persons desirous to try their rights, in the name of the attorney general, and these are
commonly called relators."); 5 JAcoB's LAW DICTIONARY 430 (1811) ("A rehearser, or teller,
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is titled "'State ex reL Doe v. Roe' it means that the state is bringing a lawsuit
for Doe against Roe."' 33 In addition to habeas corpus proceedings, the ex rel.
form is generally used in proceedings in which a third party must act for the
primary party, such as when a guardian must act for a child or a mentally
incompetent relative, or when a state attorney general must act for a citizen. 34
It is plausible to sketch out a history of the emergence of the ex rel. form
by examining historical definitions of this form and comparing them with the
history of the writ of habeas corpus. First, the writ of habeas corpus origi-
nated in England as "a highly prerogative writ by which the crown sought to
compel the appearance of a subject before its judicial organ."' 35 A key charac-
teristic of the prerogative writs was their close association with the King.' 36
Habeas corpus was a prerogative writ because "the King ought to know why
any of his subjects are imprisoned"'31 and "he [has] a right to be informed of
the state and condition of every prisoner, and for what reason he is
confined."'38 Because the King had this right to inquire, the King originally
brought the suit for a writ of habeas corpus in his name. 3 9
applied to an informer.").
133. ORAN'S DICTIONARYOF THE LAW 156 (2ded. 1991). This definition can be somewhat
misleading. Some case law discusses the relator as one who files for the writ on behalf of the
sovereign, but other case law discusses the sovereign acting for the relator. See infra notes 134,
142 for examples of each.
134. See generally Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001)
(parent brought suit against school on behalf of child); Doering ex re. Barrett v. Cooper
Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2001) (guardian ad litem brought suit on behalf of
minor children); United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West, No. C-01-1202 PJI-,
2001 WL 1463792 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2001) (relator brought qui tam complaint on behalf of
United States); People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assoc., Inc. 729 N.E.2d 965 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000) (attorney general brought suit on behalf of state's citizens against paid professional
fundraisers hired by charitable organization).
135. DUKER, supra note 115, at 4. Strictly speaking, a "prerogative writ" is a term
describing a writ's extraordinary character, in other words, a writ of this nature issued only
when other remedies were unavailable or inadequate. Id.
136. See WxES, supra note 111, § 2-2 (describing prerogative nature of writ). Five other
prerogative writs existed: the writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and
scirefacias. Id.
137. WRLnAM S. CHURCH, CHURCH ON HABEAS CORPUS § 107 (1886).
138. RoLiNC. HURD, HuRDONHABEASCoRPuS230(2ded. 1876).
139. See DUKER, supra note 115, at 4-5 (describing remedial nature of writ); see also R.
J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPus 221 (2d ed. 1989) ("As the writ issues in the King's
name, the status of the petitioner is immaterial and his detention may be inquired into even if
legal disabilities would prevent his taking an action for the enforcement of civil rights." (quoting
Re A.B. (1905) 9 CC.C. 390, 391 (Que.))); SA. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 40, 53 (1951) ("Habeas Corpus was a beneficent remedy, and it was sound politics
to associate its award with the King's personal solicitude for the welfare of his subjects.").
209
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Second, early American jurisprudence incorporated this tradition of
habeas as a writ belonging to the sovereign.140 In 1834, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts noted that the writ of habeas corpus is always in the
name of the state. 141 Other cases support this proposition and, apparently, in
the early days of the United States, the government, as sovereign, brought the
writ on behalf of its people as well. 42 This practice continued into the twenti-
eth century.143 In fact, many such cases begin with the words "[hiabeas corpus
proceeding by the United States of America.'"4
Given this history, the emergence and use of the ex rel. form is logical.
Prisoners believing themselves wrongly imprisoned related this information
in the role of informant to the sovereign, which had an interest in the state not
imprisoning its subjects wrongfully. 145 Because a writ of habeas corpus was
140. See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203,204 (Mass. 1834) (noting in
habeas corpus suit that "the writ [is] in the name of the Commonwealth").
141. Id.
142. See People v. Bradley, 60 Ill. 390, 399 (1871) (describing prerogative nature of writ
and noting "[tihe proceeding in habeas corpus... 'is an inquisition by the government at the
suggestion and instance of an individual, but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign"'
(quoting Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 108 (1847))). The Bradley court also noted
that "[w]hen independence was achieved, all of the prerogatives of the crown of England
devolved upon the people of the States." Id. at 396; see also Wade v. Judge, 5 Ala. 130, 134
(1843) ("The writ of habeas corpus is a means provided by the law, by which one unlawfully
held in custody may be released;... the plaintiff in the action is not a party to the proceeding,
but as the petitioner affirms that he is wrongfully deprived of his liberty, the State in legal
presumption, is concerned in having justice done."); Commonwealth ex rel. Clements v.
Arrison, 15 Serg. & Rawle 127, 130 (Pa. 1827) (noting that "the commonwealth stands in the
place of the king, and has succeeded to all the prerogatives ... proper for a republican govern-
ment").
143. See People ex rel. Jenkins v. Kuhne, 107 N.Y.S. 1020, 1028 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1907)
(noting, in proceedings to punish police officer for disobeying writ of habeas corpus issued on
relation of petitioner, that "[t]he entire dignity and power of the sovereign people of the state
of New York are behind [the writ] to compel obedience to its provisions both in spirit and in
letter" and that "[i]t is a state writ issued in behalf of the people of the state").
144. See Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 206 (1951) (using this
language). From my own research, I located 235 federal cases that begin with the language
"[h]abeas corpus proceeding by the United States of America."
145. This explanation comports with the meaning of relator as being a "rehearser or teller"
and "an applicant for a writ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (7th ed. 1999); 5 JACOB'S LAW
DICTIONARY 430 (1811); see SHARPE, supra note 139, at 222 (discussing third party applica-
tions). Sharpe, in a general discussion of how a prisoner who is unable to instruct a legal
adviser or friend to take steps to bring a habeas corpus proceeding, states that:
It is obviously desirable to have flexible rules governing applications in this
regard .... To a certain extent, the technical nature of habeas corpus reflects this
need. The writ issues in the name of the sovereign and represents the prerogative
power to have an account of any subjects who are imprisoned. The applicant,
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prerogative, this ex rel. form was the means by which a party complained to
the sovereign, as the sovereign alone could proceed against the usurper of its
subject's liberty. 46 Although the reason why this convention has disappeared
in some jurisdictions but has continued in others is unclear, the idea behind
the ex rel. form is clear-the sovereign has an interest in protecting its citizens
from wrongful deprivation of their liberty.
Today in the United States, a state prisoner directly applies for a writ of
habeas corpus. The writ is considered extraordinary, not prerogative.'47 In
present practice, the individual represents the sovereign's interests through the
principle of surrogacy. For example, in the proceeding United States ex rel.
Doe v. Roe, it is as if the United States has appointed Doe as its surrogate to
make its claim, as sovereign, on behalf of its people. In essence, Doe has
stepped into the shoes of the United States to litigate the claim. Again, this
principle of surrogacy harkens back to the prerogative nature of the writ of
habeas corpus because, at common law, the King brought an application for
a writ of habeas corpus in his name. 4' As noted, the point in the development
of habeas practice at which the prisoner began to apply directly for the writ
is unclear; however, the ex rel. form and certainly the surrogacy principle
behind the writ endures,149 which is why the history of the pleading and
practice of the writ is so important.
Most significantly, the surrogate nature of the ex reL form remedies the
previously described problem concerning the identity of the parties in a dual
sovereignty proceeding and a habeas proceeding. In a federal habeas proceed-
ing following a state proceeding, the United States as sovereign is implicated
just as the United States as sovereign is implicated in a federal proceeding
following a state proceeding in the dual sovereignty context. Consider the
following visual explanation:
Dual Sovereignty Context Habeas Corpus Context
State Proceeding - People v. Doe State Proceeding - People v. Doe
FederalProceeding - U.S. v. Doe FederalProceeding- U.S. ex rel. Doe v. Warden
whether the prisoner or simply a concerned third party, is, strictly speaking, not so
much a party to the proceedings as an informant.
Id.
146. See RADIN'S LAW DICTIONARY 120 (2d ed. 1970) (defining ex rel. as "[u]sed to
designate the complaining party in a criminal action").
147. See ANTIEAU, supra note 118, § 1.00 (describing current writ of habeas corpus).
148. See supra note 139 (describing prerogative nature of writ).
149. See supra note 134 for recent examples of the surrogacy principle.
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In both contexts, the United States is acting in its sovereign capacity. In a
federal habeas proceeding, the United States, as sovereign, is litigating the
interest of its people. Similarly, in a successive federal proceeding brought
under dual sovereignty, the United States, as sovereign, is litigating the
interest of its people. In the habeas case, this occurs in the sense that, histori-
cally, the sovereign and the sovereign's people have been concerned with the
liberty interests of the sovereign's citizens. 5 ' In the dual sovereignty case,
this occurs in the sense that the sovereign must independently prosecute an
accused in order to vindicate the interests of the sovereign's people."'
Considered in this light, the actions of the United States in the federal
dual sovereignty proceeding and the federal habeas proceeding are analogous.
If the United States is acting in the same capacity in both proceedings, then
the principles of comity that federal courts accord to previous state court
actions should be similar.'52 This examination of the ex rel. form demon-
strates that though at first glance the disparity in the identity of the parties
counsels against the application of habeas law to other collateral proceedings,
the parties and interests represented are, at least in the dual sovereignty
context, analogous.
B. The Nature of Collateral Proceedings
A related assumption to the idea that collateral proceedings in the dual
sovereignty context are analogous to those in the habeas context is that
collateral proceedings somehow differ from direct proceedings in a meaning-
ful way and, as such, may be characterized similarly.'53 Black's Law Dictio-
nary defines collateral as something "[a]dditional or auxiliary" and "[rielated
to, complementary.''5 Collateral proceedings thus occur after a direct or
principal proceeding and address issues "incidental to the principal proceed-
155
Habeas corpus proceedings clearly are proceedings collateral to a previ-
ous state action. 56 State prisoners use the federal writ of habeas corpus to
150. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text (discussing interest of sovereign and
its people).
151. See supra Part ll.C (discussing rationale of dual sovereignty doctrine).
152. See infra Part VIA (discussing rule of comity).
153. See WILKES, supra note 111, § 1-3 (describing federal legal remedies). Judicial
remedies for convicted persons include direct remedies, collateral remedies, and civil remedies.
Id.
154. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990).
155. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (7th ed. 1999).
156. See WLKEs, supra note 11, § 1-5 (describing federal habeas corpus for state convicts
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attack their state convictions collaterally. 1 ' A federal proceeding that occurs
after a state proceeding in the dual sovereignty context is also collateral.
Although a defendant does not initiate this proceeding, it involves the same
issues, defendants, and evidence as the previous state action. Similarly,
though the purpose of this federal proceeding is not to attack collaterally the
previous state conviction, as the dual sovereignty cases discussed in this Note
demonstrate, defendants use the federal forum to argue that a previous state
court suppression ruling should bar admission of evidence by a federal
court.' 15
Therefore, both federal habeas corpus proceedings and successive federal
proceedings under the dual sovereignty exception can be considered collateral
in nature.'5 9 They each occur after a state proceeding and involve issues
litigated in the earlier state proceeding. The nature of these collateral pro-
ceedings therefore demonstrates that such proceedings are so similar to one
another that recent congressional action concerning the rule of comity in the
habeas context should weigh heavily on the actions of federal courts in the
dual sovereignty context.
C. Summary
The history of habeas corpus, particularly in this country, is connected
intrinsically to maintaining the federalist system."6 From its origin, various
branches and levels of government have used habeas as a tool in their fight for
power.'" Thus, habeas is not only about the liberties of individuals, but also
about the proper role of the government. Originally, habeas corpus was a
highly prerogative writ used by the King to inquire into the imprisonment of
his subjects. 62 The use of the ex rel. form in habeas proceedings demon-
strates the influence of the prerogative nature of the writ. Today, this close
association embodies the principle of surrogacy, whereby the sovereign (for
as "the most important and controversial of the various federal postconviction remedies").
157. Id.
158. See supra Part M (discussing these dual sovereignty cases).
159. The counterargument to this Note's contention that successive prosecutions occurring
under the dual sovereignty exception are collateral proceedings is that successive prosecutions
are simply fortuitous and are not at all connected with the previous state prosecution. Although
such an observation has merit, because the federal government is reprosecuting the same
defendant for the same crime, these circumstances strongly point to the collateral nature of these
proceedings.
160. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text (discussing close ties between
federalism and habeas corpus).
161. See supra Part IVA.1 (discussing history of habeas corpus).
162. See supra Part IVA.2 (explaining prerogative nature of writ of habeas corpus).
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our purposes, the United States) appoints the state prisoner as its surrogate to
represent its interests and those of its people.163 In this way, the United States
acts as a party in a federal habeas proceeding in the same manner as it acts as
a party in a federal proceeding under dual sovereignty because, in both
proceedings, the United States, as sovereign, is representing the interests of
its people. Thus, the pleading and practice of the writ of habeas corpus, as
well as the distinct nature of collateral proceedings themselves, demonstrate
that federal habeas proceedings and federal dual sovereignty proceedings
provide a persuasive analogy.
V The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
This Part explores the modem law of habeas corpus, specifically by
considering recent congressional action to reform the federal writ of habeas
corpus for state prisoners. Increased deference to state court judgments has
been the primary focus of this reform."6 Such deference is the key component
of this Note's proposal. The following discussion seeks to establish that the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)'65 is the
latest congressional statement on the rule of comity regarding evidentiary
matters and therefore should extend to other collateral proceedings-namely,
those that occur under the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
A. Background
Efforts to reform the habeas corpus process and to ensure a speedier and
more effective resolution of habeas claims began in the mid-1940s.'"' The
efforts resumed in the 1980s as the Task Force on Violent Crime recom-
mended various procedural amendments to the Habeas Corpus Act. 67 Advo-
cates of these reforms later introduced bills containing the recommendations
in both houses of Congress.'"
The desire to reduce the time between conviction and execution in death
penalty cases motivated these reforms.169 Therefore, reform advocates tar-
163. See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining surrogacy principle).
164. See infra Part VA-B (noting that deference was primary focus of reforms).
165. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
166. See Larry W. Yackle,A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
381,423-24 (1996) (outlining initial assaults on habeas corpus).
167. Id. at 426.
168. Id.
169. See Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations oftheAntiterrorismAct's
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geted the following three persistent problems with the habeas system: delays
associated with federal habeas in the wake of state court consideration of
prisoners' habeas claims, inefficiencies associated with prisoners' failure to
comply with state and federal procedural rules, and perceived redundancies
associated with federal adjudication of claims previously rejected in state
court.17° Reform advocates pushed for reducing multiple appeals and for
placing greater weight on state decisions, thus bringing finality more rapidly
to capital cases.'7 1
A complicated history of legislative wrangling followed these proposed
reforms, resulting in a series of concessions by opposing sides of the reform
movement and cumulating in the introduction of the Hatch/Specter compro-
mise bill in 1995'72 Reform advocates later incorporated the bill into the
Senate antiterrorism bill in the 104th Congress. 73 The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), as it was named, then won initial
passage in the summer of 1995, and President Clinton signed it into law on
April 24, 1996.174
Although Congress considered habeas corpus reform for many years
prior to the enactment of AEDPA, Congress wanted to take a hard line on
crime after the Oklahoma City terrorism bombing. 7 Because habeas corpus
review is an essential aspect of the appeals process in death penalty cases,
Congress sought to achieve its goal by setting new limits on the habeas
process. 76 Despite the title of this Act, most of its provisions substantially
Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414,415 (1998) (discussing primary goal
of habeas reform).
170. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Patholo-
gies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penally Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
47 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997) (describing main problems associated with habeas system).
171. See Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's
Wrong with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 923 (2001) (noting that clear but
unstated goal of AEDPA was to restrain ability of federal courts to review death sentences).
172. See Yackle, supra note 166, at 425-36 (tracing history of proposed reforms and
noting crucial concessions by each side of reform movement).
173. Id. at 436.
174. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
175. See 142 CONG. REc. S3355 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("[AEDPA] is a tough on crime bill."); Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing
S.735, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 961-1 (April 24, 1996) (stating that as result
of legislation, "our law enforcement officials will have tough new tools to stop terrorists before
they strike and to bring them to justice if they do"); see also Williams, supra note 171, at 923
(examining reasons behind habeas reform's incorporation into antiterrorism bill).
176. See 142 CONG. REc. 113612 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum)
("[Wlhen the President signs this bill into law.., we will have limited the appeals that death
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amend federal habeas corpus law as it applies to state and federal prisoners in
both capital and noncapital cases.'77 Congress tied these reforms to its
antiterrorism bill out of a belief that the ultimate perpetrators convicted of the
Oklahoma City terrorist bombing would likely receive the death sentence.17
AEDPA makes several changes to existing statutory and judge-made
habeas corpus law. 79 Specifically, the Act creates a general one-year statute
of limitation within which a prisoner must file a habeas petition after the
completion of direct appeal; creates a six-month statute of limitation in death-
penalty cases; encourages states to appoint counsel for indigent state death
row inmates during state habeas or unitary appellate proceedings; requires
appellate courts to pre-approve repetitious habeas petitions; and, in the case
of appeals, requires the state prisoner to secure a certificate of appealability
from a circuit judge or justice. "0 However, most importantly, the Act in most
instances bars federal habeas courts from reconsidering legal and factual
issues ruled upon by state courts.' Such increased deference to state courts
was not only the key component of the habeas reforms,' but also the most
controversial one."8 3
row inmates can take and will have assured that sentences of death in this country will be
carried out expeditiously, as the American public wants."); see also Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A
Summary, CRS REP. No. 96-499A, at 2-3 (June 3, 1996) (noting that federal habeas is last stage
of review in most capital cases).
177. CRS REP. No. 96-499A, supra note 176, at 2; see also 142 CoNG. REC. H3606 (daily
ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("[H]abeas corpus reform... is the Holy Grail [of
the AEDPA]. We have pursued that for 14 years, in my memory.").
178. See 142 CONG. REC. H3606 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde)
("Habeas corpus is tied up with terrorism because when a terrorist is convicted of mass killings,
we want to make sure that terrorist ultimately and reasonably has the sentence imposed on him
or her."). But see 142 CoNo. REc. S3356 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(disagreeing that habeas corpus and terrorism are connected). Senator Biden stated:
[Terrorism] has nothing to do with State courts because.., if it is in a State court,
it is not a Federal crime. If it is in a State court, the Federal Government is not
prosecuting. If it is in a State court, it is not international terrorism. If it is in a
State court, it is not a terrorist under this bill.
142 CONG. Rnc. S3356 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Biden).
179. CRS REP. No. 96-499A, supra note 176, at 4.
180. Id. at 4, 6.
181. Id.
182. See 142 CONG. REc. H3608 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) ("[W]e
need habeas reform. That is the one thing, that most important element, the crown jewel [in
AEDPA], that we must have.").
183. See 142 CONG. REc. H3612 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Waters)
(stating that because of "[t]he habeas corpus reform provisions in this bill which require Federal
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B. Federal Court Deference to State Courts
1. 28 US.C. § 2254
Under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 governs applications for habeas
corpus by those in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court.114 Section
2254(d) codifies AEDPA's required deference to state courts.' 5 Under
§ 2254(d), the Act bars federal habeas relief on a claim already passed upon
by a state court unless adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.'8 6
Prior to the passage of AEDPA, state court interpretations or applications of
federal law were not binding in subsequent federal habeas proceedings, but
federal courts generally deferred to the fact-finding decisions of state
courts. 7 The new deference provisions in § 2254(d) significantly affect the
ways in which federal courts can now review state court judgments in the
habeas context."8 This fundamental change was one that proponents of the
states' rights approach to habeas corpus had advocated for years.18 9
However, as a result of the various bills that Congress fiercely debated
for many years, AEDPA was not well drafted.l" Courts have had and will
continue to have difficulty interpreting the precise meaning of the language
courts to ignore unconstitutional court convictions and sentences unless the State court decision,
though wrong as a constitutional matter, was unreasonably wrong, innocent persons will be held
in prison or executed in violation of the Constitution"); see also Woolley, supra note 169, at
422 (noting that deference requirement was most controversial section of habeas reform and that
bill's opponents focused efforts on eliminating this section).
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (governing federal habeas corpus for state prisoners).
185. See id. § 2254(d) (codifying section 104 of AEDPA).
186. Id.
187. CRS REP. No. 96-499A, supra note 176, at 7.
188. See WILKEs, supra note 111, § 8-1 (discussing manner in which AEDPA narrowed
power of federal courts to review state court judgments).
189. See 142 CoNG. REC. I3606 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde)
(discussing how long Congress has pursued these provisions); see also Larry W. Yackle, The
Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1759 (2000) (noting that "tihe quarrel is, and has
always been, over whether federal habeas courts should entertain federal claims as a sequel to
state court adjudication of those same federal claims").
190. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (stating, in one of first cases
interpreting AEDPA, that "[a]ll we can say is that in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the
Act [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting").
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of the statute.' Since passage of the Act, scholars' views of the deference
provisions have differed broadly. Some argue that the provisions fit within
the overarching scheme of federal jurisdiction," while others contend that
this type of increased deference to state courts is blatantly unconstitutional.'93
Debate has centered on how courts should read AEDPA's deference
requirement to apply to questions of law, questions of fact, and questions of
mixed law and fact.'94 Appellate courts customarily use different standards
of review for legal conclusions and findings of fact. 95 Section 2254(d)
appears to establish standards of review based on the type of question in-
volved;" however, commentators and courts disagree on what these standards
entail.1
97
2. (Terry) Williams v. Taylor
The Supreme Court addressed some of these disagreements with its 2000
decision in Williams v. Taylor.l  In Williams, the Court explored the level of
191. See Yackle, supra note 166, at 382 (noting that "extraordinarily arcane verbiage [of
law] will require considerable time and resources to sort out").
192. See id. at 384 (stating that "[ilf we put aside what some of us thought Congress would
do and start looking (closely) at what Congress has actually done, I think we will find that there
is more bark in this dog than bite").
193. See 142 CoNG. REc. S3439 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(quoting letter from former United States Attorneys General arguing that deference provisions
are unconstitutional); Note, Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and
Scope of Review, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1551, 1559 (2001) [hereinafter Powers of Congress]
(discussing views of scholars who believe that deference provisions are unconstitutional because
Court has same duties on both direct and habeas review); Woolley, supra note 169, at 416
(stating that, "[airguably, the AEDPA is unconstitutional").
194. See Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated)
User 'sManual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103,108-15 (1998) (describing commentators' disagreement
over correct standard of review).
195. See id. at 108 (explaining various standards of appellate review). Courts usually
review trial court conclusions of law less deferentially than findings of fact and use a separate
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact. Id.; see infra note 270 (explaining
distinction between legal conclusions and findings of fact).
196. See id. (noting that § 2254 appears to follow traditional approach, with separate
standards of review for questions of fact, law, and mixed law and fact).
197. See id. (describing courts' and commentators' views of standard of review under
§ 2254).
198. (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In Williams, the Court considered
the issue of whether Terry Williams was denied effective assistance of counsel during the
sentencing phase of his prosecution for capital murder. Id. at 367. The Court also examined
whether the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to set aside his death sentence "was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
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deference that federal courts must give to state courts in the habeas context
under § 2254(d). 199 Although the Court rejected readings of § 2254 that
would have essentially eliminated the availability of habeas review, the Court
interpreted the language as mandating much more deference than many civil
libertarians would have desired."c
the Supreme Court of the United States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Id. On
the first issue, the Court found that Williams's counsel was constitutionally ineffective because
counsel failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence during the trial's
sentencing phase. Id. at 395-99. On the second issue, under Justice Stevens's analysis of the
statute, § 2254(dXl) "directs federal courts to attend to every state-court judgment with utmost
care, but it does not require them to defer to the opinion of every reasonable state-court judge
on the content of federal law." Id. at 389 (Stevens, J., concurring). But Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, disagreed with this interpretation and noted that Congress did not
amend 28 U.S.C. § 2254 simply to maintain the present federal standard of review. Id. at
402-03. Justice O'Connor reiterated that under a cardinal principal of statutory construction,
the Court must give effect to every word in the statute. Id. at 404. Under this construction,
Justice O'Connor stated that Justice Stevens erred by failing to give independent meaning to
both the "contrary to" and the "unreasonable application" clauses of the statute. Id. Justice
O'Connor clarified the correct standard of review, stating that:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id. at 412-13. Under the "unreasonable application" standard, Justice O'Connor noted that "the
most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 410. Therefore, she explained that "a federal habeas
court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. The Court
ultimately held that the Virginia Supreme Court acted unreasonably by failing to consider the
totality of the omitted mitigation evidence in its refusal to set aside Williams's death sentence.
Id. at 416. The Court thus reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to
the trial court for a new sentencing proceeding. Id. at 396.
199. See id. at 377 (discussing correct interpretation of § 2254(d)).
200. See id. at 410 (rejecting Fourth Circuit's "all reasonable jurists" standard, whereby
application of law to fact is unreasonable only when all reasonable jurists would agree that
application is unreasonable, and thus holding that standard of reasonableness is objective); see
also The Supreme Court 1999 Term: Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REv. 179,328-29 (2000)
[hereinafter The Supreme Court] (acknowledging that language in Williams indicates that courts
should give extreme deference, but noting that Court showed that neither "contrary" nor
"unreasonable application" review is as deferential as interpretation indicates because Court
found that counsel's assistance was ineffective and lower court's determination was unreason-
able). The Williams decision has evoked criticism. See James S. Liebman, An "Effective Death
Penalty"? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROoK. L. REv. 411,420 (2001)
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a. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
In the most significant portion of the Court's opinion, it read § 2254 to
require federal courts to leave reasonable but wrong state court decisions
undisturbed in the habeas context.2' Therefore, a federal court cannot grant
habeas relief if it simply disagrees with what a state court has done or believes
that the state court incorrectly or erroneously applied the law; rather, the state
court must have been unreasonable in its application of law to fact as well.2'
The Court thus interpreted § 2254(d)(1) to mandate an "unreasonableness"
standard for mixed questions of law and fact.2 3
b. Questions of Law
The Court determined that the "contrary to ... clearly established Federal
law" language in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applied only to clear questions of law.204
A decision is "contrary" only if the Supreme Court has specifically ruled on
the issue and the state court misapplies Supreme Court precedent. 20 In
contrast, district and appellate court decisions on questions of law on which
the Supreme Court has not clearly ruled do not qualify under this interpreta-tion.20' Therefore, if a state court decides a question of law in a manner
contrary to the holdings of district courts or appellate courts, but this question
(arguing that Williams Court's interpretation of § 2254(d) raises serious constitutional problems
because it failed to consider fundamental role of Article m courts to assure that state law,
"including state decisional law, does not contravene the U.S. Constitution and other federal
law"); Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1592 (2000) (criticizing Williams as artificially exclud-
ing considerations of unconstitutionality of AEDPA).
201. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 (noting difference between unreasonable and wrong
state court decisions); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. _, , 123 S. Ct. 1166,
1174-75 (2003) (finding that United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit erred in defining
"unreasonable application" to mean clear error and noting that "unreasonable application"
standard means an "objectively unreasonable" error must be found before federal court can grant
habeas relief.).
202. Williams, 529 U.S. at 411.
203. See Yackle, supra note 189, at 1751 (noting that Williams Court interpreted
§ 2254(dXl) as setting "unreasonableness" standard of review for mixed questions of law and
fact).
204. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (discussing analysis of "contrary
to" clearly established federal law); see also The Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 322 (noting
that Supreme Court reserved "contrary" analysis for clear questions of law).
205. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (stating that "[the] statutory phrase refers to the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-
court decision").
206. Id.
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of law is not one upon which the Supreme Court has clearly ruled, this deci-
sion would not be a "contrary" application of federal law. 207
But because the difference between a question of law and an application
of law to facts can be one of semantics, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the statute in Williams "asks courts to impose and recognize categories on a
spectrum that admits of no clear divisions.""2ra Significantly, the Williams
Court noted that it will often be difficult to distinguish a decision involving
an unreasonable extension of a legal principle from a decision that arrives at
a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of
law.2" However, the Court concluded that the Williams case did not require
it to decide how courts should treat these "extension of legal principle"
cases.210 The Court did not have to decide this issue because it found that the
Virginia state court's decision was both "contrary to" and an "unreasonable
application" of clearly established federal law.2"
Although the Court could have interpreted the "contrary" language to
prescribe de novo review, it did not.21 2 By interpreting "clearly established
Federal law" to refer only to Supreme Court holdings, the Court interpreted
the statute to give some level of deference to state courts on review of ques-
tions of law. 13 While this interpretation requires federal courts to give
deference to state court judgments under the "contrary" prong only on issues
on which the Supreme Court has not ruled, district courts do not perform an
independent review of state court decisions as they would under a traditional
de novo review standard.214 However, these situations admittedly are rare.
207. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000) (commenting that federal court
may only grant habeas relief if it determines that state court decision is contrary to, or unreason-
able application of, Supreme Court jurisprudence, not circuit court precedent); see also The
Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 322 ("For a decision to be 'contrary,' it cannot merely be a
ruling that the district court would determine differently, it must be one with which the Supreme
Court has specifically disagreed.").
208. The Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 326.
209. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,408 (2000).
210. Id. at 408-09.
211. Id. at 416.
212. See The Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 327 (describing how Court could have
interpreted "contrary" language to require de novo review, but chose not to do so).
213. Id.
214. See id. (noting that "contrary" inquiry will allow state court decisions to stand when
decisions are contrary to lower federal court jurisprudence but not contrary to Supreme Court
holdings); see also Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838,
1861 (2002) [hereinafter The Law of Prisons] (arguing that "AEDPA's 'clearly established law'
requirement limits the federal district courts' ability to participate in the evolution of constitu-
tional standards for state criminal cases"). Several courts of appeals have also interpreted
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c. Questions of Fact
The Williams Court did not specifically consider how courts should
review questions of fact in the habeas context, but commentators have gener-
AEDPA to require federal courts to exhibit some deference to state courts on findings of law.
See Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that, in conducting habeas
review, court must defer to state court conclusions of law); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 944
(6th Cir. 2000) (noting that § 2254(d) marks significant change by preventing district courts
from looking to lower federal court decisions in determining "whether the state court decision
is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law"). However,
other circuits have interpreted AEDPA as requiring a traditional de novo standard of review for
questions of law. See Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,689-90 (4th Cir. 2001) (interpreting Williams
to reaffirm federal habeas corpus courts' obligation to review state court judgment independ-
ently when that state court decision is "contrary to clearly established federal law"); Ouska v.
Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that federal court review of
whether state court ruling was "contrary to" clearly established federal law is de novo).
The Court's recent decision in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. _ , 123 S. Ct. 1166
(2003), supports the view that § 2254(d)'s "contrary" language does not prescribe de novo
review. In Lockyer, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of § 2254(d) that federal habeas courts should review a state court
decision de novo before applying the AEDPA standard of review. Id. at 1172. The Ninth
Circuit utilized a two-step approach in deciding whether a California Court of Appeal's decision
affirming a habeas petitioner's sentence was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of
"clearly established" law as set forth by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1174-75. Under this
approach, the Ninth Circuit first decided on a de novo basis whether a state court's decision was
contrary to "clearly established" law, if the decision was "contrary," the Ninth Circuit then took
up the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d). Id. at 1171-73. However, the Court
found such an approach inconsistent with the statutory language of § 2254(d), noting that
"AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one methodology in deciding the
only question that matters under § 2254(dX1)--whether a state court decision is contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 1172.
The Court also took a narrow view of "clearly established Federal law" in Lockyer. At
issue was whether the habeas petitioner's sentence was so grossly disproportionate to his crime
that it violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
A state jury found the habeas petitioner guilty of two felony counts of petty theft and the judge
sentenced him to two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life in prison under California's
three strikes law. Id. at 1171. In reviewing the petitioner's habeas writ, the Ninth Circuit found
that the California Court of Appeal disregarded the Supreme Court's decision in Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983), regarding proportionality analysis. Lockyer, 123 S. Ct. at 1171-72. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief under § 2254. Id. at 1172. However, the Lockyer Court
found that the law in this area was far from clear. Id. at 1173. Specifically, it characterized its
Eighth Amendment cases as "exhibit[ing] a lack of clarity regarding what factors may indicate
gross disproportionality." Id. Because of this lack of clarity, the Court found the California
Court of Appeal's decision was not "contrary to" or involved an "unreasonable application" of
governing legal principles set forth in Supreme Court cases. Id. at 1174. The Lockyer case thus
demonstrates that federal courts should interpret narrowly what constitutes "clearly established
Federal law" under § 2254(d) and should only grant relief when the Court's jurisprudence in
the particular area is clear and a state court disregards this clear precedent.
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ally agreed that under § 2254 a federal court would have difficulty in over-
turning a state court finding of fact.2"5 First, § 2254(d)(2) clearly prescribes
an unreasonableness standard for questions of fact.2" 6 Second, § 2254(e)
states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct."2 ' These provisions taken together require federal
courts to give state court determinations of fact complete deference." 8
3. Legislative History of Deference Provisions
and Prior Supreme Court Jurisprudence
In order to understand the impact of AEDPA and the Williams decision
on this Note's proposal, a discussion of the legislative history of AEDPA's
deference provisions and previous Supreme Court cases concerning habeas
corpus is necessary. As previously discussed, habeas reformers long fought
for the deference provisions in AEDPA.219 Although the legislative history of
AEDPA is unfortunately vague on how courts should interpret the actual
language of AEDPA,"0 the legislative history reveals the tension between
parties on both sides of the reform movement.22
A congressional floor debate that involved the proposal of two amend-
ments to change the language of § 2254(d) during AEDPA's consideration is
215. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (explaining standard of review for
questions of fact).
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2000) ("[R]esulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court
proceeding."); see also Lee, supra note 194, at 108 (stating that standard of review for findings
of fact is "unreasonableness").
217. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(eX) (2000); see also Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden,
Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 337, 371-72 (1997) (noting that changes in § 2254(e)
retain presumption of correctness for factual issues but abolish all exceptions to presumption
contained in old statute).
218. See Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that § 2254(eXl)
provides highly deferential standard of review for state court factual determinations because
federal court must presume that state court's factual determination is correct); Gilliam v.
Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990,992 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); see also Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling
Constitutional Fact: De Nova Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J.
1427, 1439 n.67 (2001) (noting that §§ 2254(dX2) and (eXI) together make it extremely
difficult for federal court to overturn state court's findings of fact).
219. See supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text (describing history of reform
movement).
220. See Scheidegger, supra note 120, at 945 (noting that standard Congress actually
adopted has sparse legislative history because of standard's late emergence in habeas debate).
221. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
AEDPA).
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particularly instructive. Senator Jon Kyl proposed language that would have
largely eliminated federal habeas corpus as a vehicle for state prisoners to
obtain postconviction review.2 Senator Kyl argued that when the state court
system offers a prisoner a complete and adequate remedy, that prisoner should
not have the authority to proceed to the federal court system to relitigate all of
the same claims.2" Supporters of the Kyl amendment echoed Senator Kyl's
reasoning and emphasized the need for federal courts to abstain from litigating
issues already decided by state courts out of respect for state court judg-
ments. 24 In contrast, Senator Joseph Biden proposed an amendment to strike
the deference rule completely and to retain the pre-AEDPA practice of inde-
pendent review.' Senator Biden believed that the § 2254 language, as en-
acted, gave too much deference to state courts."' The Senate ultimately
rejected each of these amendments in favor of the current standard; however,
the debate over these two amendments evinces the strong feelings of members
of Congress concerning the federalist structure of the American judicial
222. See 141 CONG. REC. S7829 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (propos-
ing amendment that would deny habeas relief to person in custody pursuant to state judgment
unless remedies of state court were inadequate or ineffective to test legality of person's deten-
tion). The Senate rejected the amendment by a vote of thirty-eight in favor to sixty-one opposed.
141 CONG. REC. 57849 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
223. See 141 CONG. REC. S7830 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (quoting
letter from Judge Robert Bork); 141 CONG. REc. S7836 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Kyl) (arguing that United States judicial system has been understood from its very
beginning as allowing state courts to resolve federal constitutional issues).
224. See 141 CONG. REC. 57834 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Lott) (speaking
in support of Kyl amendment and stating that "there is simply no basis for allowing additional
rounds of litigation on the same claims in the lower Federal courts"); 141 CONG. REC. S7835
(daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (speaking in support of Kyl amendment and
discussing frustration with federal courts' micromanagement of state court decisions); see also
Crime Bill Issues: Hearing on S.735 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1995) (statement of Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California) (stating that
"[r]eexamination of state convictions on federal habeas review frustrate[s] ... [b]oth the state's
sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempt to honor constitutional
rights").
225. See 141 CONG. REC. S7840 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(proposing amendment to delete rule of deference from habeas corpus bill). The Senate voted
to table the Biden amendment by a thin margin, with a vote of fifty-three in favor to forty-six
opposed. 141 CONG. REC. S7849-50 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
226. See 141 CONG. REC. S7843 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden)
("Placing primary responsibility for the Federal Constitution in the hands of State courts is a
dramatic departure from this country's historical principle, and that is that it is the Federal
courts that should be the final arbiters of Federal law."); see also 141 CONG. REC. S7839 (daily
ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Cohen) (stating that bill would require federal court to
stand by and do nothing even if presented with incorrect state court ruling, a result that would
effectively prevent habeas corpus from serving any meaningful role).
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system. 27 The strong words used by the opponents of the final deference
provisions also help to illustrate the dramatic change that this provision made
to existing law.
22
Moreover, statements of Senator Orrin Hatch, the primary sponsor of the
habeas deference provisions codified in § 2254, demonstrate that he believed
that the Act established substantial deference.229 Senator Hatch specifically
referred to the case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 0 in which the Supreme Court
held that qualified immunity protects public officials unless they violate
227. See Scheidegger, supra note 120, at 946 (describing current standard as compromise
between positions of amendments).
228. See 142 CONG. REc. H3610 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Berman)
(stating that "this package of 'reforms' you are being asked to vote for would raise hurdles so
high to such essential review as to effectively ensure injustices of wrongful conviction will go
unremedied"); 142 CONG. REc. H3614 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pelosi)
(noting that bill severely limits power of federal courts to correct unconstitutional incarcera-
tion); 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Kennedy) (stating
that "[w]hat we have [in this bill] is an undoing of the Federal Government's rights to intervene
in the State courts"), 142 CONG. REC. S3458 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (stating that "[AEDPA] eviscerates the ancient Writ of Habeas Corpus, denying death
row inmates the opportunity to obtain even one meaningful Federal review of the constitutional-
ity of their convictions"); 142 CONG. REc. S3439 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (noting distress over bill's virtual elimination of habeas corpus and stating, "if I had
to choose between living in a country with habeas corpus but without free elections, or a
country with free elections but without habeas corpus, I would choose habeas corpus every
time"); see also Crime Bill Issues. Hearing on S. 735 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Emergency Committee to Save
Habeas Corpus) (noting destructive impact of deference requirement on ability of federal courts
to enforce United States Constitution by stating that "federal courts will be unconditionally
barred from assessing the constitutionality of certain state judgments-judgments involving the
most awesome power of the states over their citizens, the power to strip them of their liberty or
life").
229. See 142 CoNG. REc. 53447 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(discussing Supreme Court cases that support preference for reasonableness standard in
reviewing state action).
230. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The issue in Harlow concerned the scope
of immunity available to President Nixon's senior aides and advisers in a suit for damages based
upon their official acts. Id. at 802. The Harlow Court discussed the various types of immunity
that a court could extend in cases involving government officials and concluded that a court,
on the facts of the present case, should grant only qualified immunity. Id. at 809. The Court
then held that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are immune
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818.
The Court noted that this objective reasonableness standard for an official's conduct, as
measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excess disruption of government.
Id.
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clearly established rights.2" This reference is exceedingly important because
Senator Hatch compared the deference provisions in the habeas reforms to the
preference for reasonableness that courts give in other areas of the law.232 The
area of qualified immunity, in particular, is one of extreme deference.233
Senator Hatch next stated:
Our proposed standard simply ends the improper review of State court
decisions. After all, State courts are required to uphold the Constitution
and to faithfully apply Federal laws. There is simply no reason that Federal
courts should have the ability to virtually retry cases that have been prop-
erly adjudicated by our State courts.234
Other than qualified immunity, courts employ such reasonableness deference
in only a few areas of the law, most notably in the areas of administrative law
and political questions. 35
Furthermore, the trend of decisions by the Supreme Court illustrates this
concern for federalism.236 After an expansion of defendants' rights under the
Warren Court, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts started a pattern of retrenching
the availability of habeas writs.237 The Court's decision in Wright v. West"
231. See id. (establishing qualified immunity for government officials).
232. See 142 CONG. REc. S3447 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("Why then, given this preference for reasonableness in the law, should we empower a Federal
court to reverse a State court's reasonable application of Federal law to the facts?"). Senator
Hatch also cited United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held
that if the actions of police officers who conducted a search were reasonable, then no Fourth
Amendment violation would occur and a court could not suppress evidence obtained as a result
of the search. 142 CONG. REc. S3447 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
233. See Scheidegger, supra note 120, at 925 (discussing qualified immunity and noting
close analogy between such immunity and new habeas reform). But see Lee, supra note 194,
at 123-24 (arguing that one cannot assimilate meaning of "clearly established" as used in
Harlow to meaning of "clearly established" in § 2254(dX1) because qualified immunity protects
officers from personal liability for damage awards and habeas jurisdiction does not impose
personal liability on state judges).
234. 142 CoNG. REc. S3447 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
235. See Powers of Congress, supra note 193, at 1560 (identifying areas of deferential
review).
236. See Patricia L. Donze, Legislating Comity: Can Congress Enforce Federalism
Constraints Through Restrictions on Preemption Doctrine?, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGis. & PUB. PoL'Y
239, 239 (2001) (arguing that recent opinions by United States Supreme Court demonstrate
major shift in Court's view of federalism).
237. See Melissa L. Koehn, A Line in the Sand: The Supreme Court and the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 32 TULSA. L.J. 389, 390 (1997) (noting that approximately two decades ago
Supreme Court began retrenching availability of habeas writs, particularly through creation of
very technical procedures for petitions); Steiker, supra note 123, at 1709 (noting that Court has
significantly retreated from landmark decisions of early Warren Court that secured robust
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shows that several Justices already thought (prior to the passage of AEDPA)
that federal courts should defer to state court decisions in the habeas context. 9
Similarly, in Teague v. Lane,240 decided three years prior to West, the Court
ruled that federal courts could not retroactively apply new constitutional rules
to cases pending on collateral review.24' Teague gave limited deference to
habeas review of federal claims brought by state prisoners); David Blumberg, Note, Habeas
Leaps from the Pan and into the Fire: Jacobs v. Scott and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 AIB. L. REV. 557, 559-60 (1997) (discussing difference in
treatment under Warren and Rehnquist Courts); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,491
(1991) ("Our federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal
norms through criminal law, but the power of a State to pass laws means little if the State cannot
enforce them.").
238. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (plurality opinion). In Wright, the Court faced
the issue of whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly
determined that the evidence against the defendant was insufficient, as a matter of due process,
to support his state-court conviction for grand larceny. Id. at 280 (plurality opinion). The Court
found that the evidence against the defendant was more than sufficient to support a conviction
regardless of whether mixed constitutional questions were subject to plenary or deferential
federal habeas review. Id. at 295 (plurality opinion). However, Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated that the Court should adopt deferential review
of mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 285-94 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas noted
that habeas should "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems."
Id. at 292 (plurality opinion) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). Justice Thomas argued that the need for finality and the intrusion
upon state sovereignty by federal courts in habeas cases justified such a standard. Id. at 293
(plurality opinion).
239. See id. at 285-94 (plurality opinion) (arguing that Court has moved toward treating
state court decisions deferentially).
240. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). The issue in Teague
concerned whether a court could retroactively apply a new rule requiring a fair cross section of
jurors in a petit jury to the case before the Supreme Court. Id. at 300-01 (plurality opinion).
The Court adopted the standard that Justice Harlan described in Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667 (1971). Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion). Justice Harlan believed that
courts should not apply new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases on collateral
review unless they fell within two enumerated exceptions. Id. at 306 (plurality opinion). First,
a court should apply a new rule retroactively if it places "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." Id.
at 307 (plurality opinion). Second, a court should apply a new rule retroactively if it requires
the observance of "those procedures that ... are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'
Id. (plurality opinion). The Teague Court reasoned that it must also consider concerns of
comity and finality in determining the proper scope of habeas review. Id. at 308 (plurality
opinion). Applying the new standard, the Court then found that it could not address petitioner's
substantive claim because a court could not retroactively apply this new rule to all defendants
on collateral review through one of the two enumerated exceptions. Id. at 316 (plurality
opinion).
241. See id. at 310 (plurality opinion) (announcing that new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not apply to those cases that have become final before Court announces new
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state courts by prohibiting federal courts from overturning state convictions
based on new constitutional rules. 42 Thus, the Supreme Court's habeas
jurisprudence against which Congress enacted AEDPA demonstrates that
Congress intended the broad deference interpretation elucidated by the Wil-
liams Court. 43 This shift in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which placed
much more emphasis on concerns for federalism and comity, is an important
component of the overall shift in power back to the states in the habeas con-
text, and perhaps in other contexts.
C. Summary
As Professor Larry Yackle notes, "concerns about federalism, comity,
and parity figure mightily in the habeas context, just as they do in most other
contexts in which federal law orchestrates the competition between state and
federal courts for adjudicative authority regarding federal questions. '244 With
the passage of AEDPA, the balance of power between state and federal
government in criminal law enforcement has shifted back to the states in a
powerful fashion. 24 This shift demonstrates Congress's "renewed respect for
state courts and their judgments... recogniz[ing] their role as 'coequal parts
of our national judicial system. , 246
rules). The Teague doctrine has been the subject of much criticism, and the impact of AEDPA
on the doctrine remains uncertain. Compare Yackle, supra note 166, at 415-21 (arguing that
observers reading statute to codify Teague are incorrect because § 2254(d) does not mention
exceptions to Teague) with The Law of Prisons, supra note 214, at 1860 (noting that AEDPA
codifies Teague in some respects).
242. See The Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 325 (recognizing limited deference of
Teague); see also Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 375 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting) (noting that AEDPA reflects strong interests in finality and comity served by Teague
doctrine).
243. See The Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 325 (noting how background of federal
habeas interpretation against which Congress enacted deference foreshadowed Williams Court's
interpretation of deference provisions); see also The Law of Prisons, supra note 214, at 1860
(noting that Congress, with passage of AEDPA, "allied itself with the Supreme Court's recent
habeas jurisprudence in its belief in parity and concern for federalism interests").
244. Yackle, supra note 189, at 1759.
245. See Hartman & Nyden, supra note 217, at 352 (noting shift in balance of power
between state and federal governments since passage of AEDPA).
246. Scheidegger, supra note 120, at 953 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241
(1990)). But see FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 152 (discussing jurisprudence in which
Supreme Court invoked federalism as justification for restrictions on habeas corpus and arguing
that "[t]o invoke federalism to justify such results is untenable.., the view of federalism that
animated the framers supports careful federal review of state court criminal convictions, not
deference to the sovereign rights of states to deprive citizens of Constitutionally protected
liberty").
228
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The Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Taylor underscores this
shift in power.247 Although anchored in habeas corpus law, Williams is also
very much a piece of the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence.24 The
Court's decision, while not definitive in all respects, illustrates how federal
courts should review state court decisions in the habeas context. Federal
courts must give complete deference to state court findings of fact, substantial
deference to findings on mixed questions of law and fact, and some deference
to findings on questions of law.249
This increased deference is central to this Note's proposal. If federal
courts must defer to state courts in collateral proceedings in the habeas con-
text, then they should defer to state courts in collateral proceedings in the dual
sovereignty context. AEDPA mandates such deference. Both the legislative
history of AEDPA and the Supreme Court's renewed concern for federalism
demonstrate that such deference is necessary out of respect for the role of state
courts in the American judicial system. As Senator Hatch stated, "there is
simply no reason that Federal courts should have the ability to virtually retry
247. See supra Part V.B.2 (analyzing Williams decision); see also Todd E. Pettys, Federal
Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for "Reasonably Erroneous" Applications of Federal
Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731,732 (2002) (noting that Williams Court "determined that § 2254(d)'s
'unreasonable application' clause jettisons more than half a century's worth of habeas jurispru-
dence relating to state courts' applications of federal law to fact").
248. See The Law ofPrisons, supra note 214, at 1846 (noting that, with AEDPA, Congress
"has come down firmly in the camp of the Rehnquist Court, which has been attempting to curtail
the Warren Court's legacy of federal district court involvement in state institutional reform").
249. See supra Part V.B.2 (analyzing Williams decision). The Williams Court's analysis
of the standard of review under § 2254 provides the background for this Note's proposal in
cases in which the questions involved are clearly ones of fact, law, or the application of law to
fact But courts and commentators have proposed methods that federal habeas courts should
employ in cases in which no clear delineation exists among questions of law, fact, and mixed
law/fact. See Yackle, supra note 189, at 1754 (proposing two-step process for federal habeas
courts post-Williams). Yackle proposes that federal courts should first determine whether a
state court reached an erroneous judgment in light of "clearly established Federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court." Id. Then, if the state court reached an erroneous judgment,
the federal court must determine whether the resulting state court decision constituted an
"unreasonable application" of those holdings. Id. The availability of federal habeas relief then
depends on whether a state court decision diverges unreasonably from the result that the
Supreme Court itself would have reached at the time. Id.; see also Werts v. Vaugh, 228 F.3d
178, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing different two-step analysis post-Williams).
Courts will likely need to revamp their various two-step processes for federal habeas
review after the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. _ 123 S.
Ct. 1166 (2003). In Lockyer, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's formulation of a two-step
process whereby the Ninth Circuit first determined whether a state court decision was "contrary
to clearly established Federal Law" before moving to the "unreasonable application" prong. See
supra note 214 (describing Lockyer Court's decision).
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cases that have been properly adjudicated by our State courts. ''250 If Senator
Hatch was correct, then this concern likely was the central motivating force
behind AEDPA, and one can make a strong argument that this deference
extends beyond the habeas context. In fact, AEDPA is the latest congressional
statement on the rule of comity as it applies to evidentiary matters and, as such,
applies to other collateral proceedings, specifically those under the dual
sovereignty exception.
V. A Proposal for Federal Court Review of Suppression Issues
in the Dual Sovereignty Context
This Note explores two distinct areas of criminal law: the dual sover-
eignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause and the writ of habeas corpus.
This Note seeks to demonstrate, using recent legislation by the United States
Congress and historical material, that these two areas of law are not quite so
distinct. In fact, notions of fairness, justice, and uniformity of criminal law
should govern each area similarly. Previous Parts have sought to lay the
groundwork to support this Note's proposal.25" ' This Part functions to solidify
these ideas into a working analysis. First, by exploring the rule of comity and
then by illustrating how this Note's proposal would work in practice, this Part
outlines how federal courts should apply AEDPA's rule of comity in the dual
sovereignty context. This Part concludes by addressing the potential criticisms
of this Note's proposal.
A. The Rule of Comity
Both the dual sovereignty doctrine and AEDPA's deference provisions
rest upon notions of judicial comity. Black's Law Dictionary defines judicial
comity as "[t]he respect a court of one state or jurisdiction shows to another
state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other's laws and judicial deci-
sions.""' The rule of comity is an enduring and essential component of the
United States' system of government. 251 While the doctrine of comity is one
250. 142 CONG. REC. S3447 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
251. See supra Parts II-V (discussing dual sovereignty, history of habeas corpus, nature
of collateral proceedings, and AEDPA).
252. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (7th ed. 1999); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37,44 (1971) (defining comity). In Younger, the Supreme Court defined comity as:
[A] proper respect for state court functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of
the belief that that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Id.
253. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (describing need for comity between
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of policy and not an absolute rule,254 the Supreme Court has spoken of the
doctrine with the highest regard, noting:
The forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, administered
under a single system, exercise towards each other, whereby conflicts are
avoided, by avoiding interference with the process of each other, is a
principle of comity, with perhaps no higher sanction than the utility which
comes from concord; but between State courts and those of the United
States, it is something more. It is a principle of right and of law, and there-
fore, of necessity.
255
Many have argued that the endurance of comity is essential to the strength of
the United States' system of federalism, and because federal and state powers
overlap to some degree, comity acts as a necessary buffer to the friction
resulting from this overlap.256
The dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is itself
a judicially crafted doctrine used as a rule of comity. The rationales that
courts repeatedly employ to justify the dual sovereignty exception invoke this
concern for comity." The idea that a single act is an offense against the
peace and dignity of both the federal and state governments and that each
sovereign should have the ability to punish the wrongdoer demonstrates this
concern for comity.
federal and state courts), overruled in part by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The Darr
Court spoke of the need for comity in the habeas context. Id. It described the emergence of the
rule of comity as a solution for the problems that could occur if a federal district court could
upset a state court conviction without an opportunity for a state court to correct the constitu-
tional violation. Id. The Darr Court noted that the doctrine "teaches that one court should defer
action on cases properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with
concurrent powers... have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter." Id; see also Exparte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) ("[P]ublic good requires that those relations [between state
and federal courts] be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.").
254. See Norlynn Blocker, Comment, An Exercise in Comity: Exhaustion of State
Remedies in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 497, 506 (1983)
(acknowledging that body of law has never explicitly codified doctrine of comity as wooden
rule, but "because of its great importance in maintaining harmony within the law of nations, its
principles are tacitly presumed and adopted by all courts of justice").
255. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176,182 (1884).
256. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45 (discussing comity and noting that "[ilt should never
be forgotten that [the] slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union
of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future"); see also
Blocker, supra note 254, at 506 (noting that "[ildcals of comity have earned domestic signifi-
cance as an indispensible facet of American federalism").
257. See supra Part ll.C (discussing rationale of dual sovereignty doctrine).
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First, one concern of the federal courts is that one sovereign will be able
to exercise greater power than the other unless federal and state governments
can each independently punish the wrongdoer. Consequently, not only would
disallowing successive state-federal prosecutions deprive the people of each
sovereign the ability to punish the wrongdoer adequately, but the system of
federalism could also break down.258 Therefore, each sovereign allows the
other to prosecute the wrongdoer for the same conduct. A second concern of
federal courts is that prohibiting successive prosecutions would cause a race
to the courthouse of the sovereign with the more lenient penalties." 9 What-
ever truth this concern may have in the criminal justice system's current
climate of cooperative federalism, underlying its repeated assertion is the idea
that comity directs each sovereign to respect the control exercised by the other
sovereign within its confines.26 Thus, the principle of comity is integral to
the dual sovereignty doctrine.
Comity also weighs heavily in the habeas corpus context. The restric-
tions surrounding the federal writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners stem
from comity concerns.26" ' If federal courts overrule a state court judgment
because they believe that they are better at deciding federal constitutional
issues or that they should enforce their policies in all matters before them,
then this appropriation could endanger the federalist system.262 Courts,
commentators, and legislators have repeatedly invoked principles of federal-
ism and comity in any discussion of habeas corpus, and they invoked these
principles in conjunction with AEDPA.263 In one of the first cases concerning
258. See supra Part lI.C (discussing rationale of dual sovereignty doctrine).
259. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (stating that to deny state its power to
enforce its criminal laws because another state wins race to courthouse "would be a shocking
and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and
order within their confines" (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959))).
260. Id.
261. See Blocker, supra note 254, at 500 (discussing comity's role in history of habeas
corpus and stating that "the Great Writ has, for over a hundred years, been the object of heated
criticism by states' rights advocates as a serious threat to our system of dual sovereignty").
262. See 141 CONG. REc. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I
know there are people here who believe that only the Federal courts tell the truth. That just is
not true. State courts, in many respects, are just as good, if not better, than the Federal
courts-in these areas .. "); see also Sandra D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between
the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 801, 814 (1981) (writing on importance of nation's bifurcated system and noting that
"[sitate courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to litigate federal constitutional questions.
State judges in assuming office take an oath to support the federal as well as the state constitu-
tion .... It is a step in the right direction to defer to the state courts and give finality to their
judgments .... ).
263. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) ("This is a case about federal-
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AEDPA, the Supreme Court stated that "AEDPA's purpose [is] comity,
finality, and federalism."2 Courts deciding cases under AEDPA's regime
have continued to invoke this concern for federalism in their interpretation of
the statute.265 Thus, comity is also integral to habeas corpus.
Although notions of comity underlie both the dual sovereignty doctrine
and the writ of habeas corpus, these notions diverge in one key respect.
Whereas in the dual sovereignty arena, comity preserves independent prosecu-
tions by state and federal governments, in the habeas context, comity deters
federal courts from reviewing the judgments of state courts. Therefore, in the
habeas realm, comity prevents the independent review of facts and law
expressly mandated by comity in the dual sovereignty doctrine. But as noted
in Part II.C, one can make a strong case that comity in the dual sovereignty
context should encourage federal courts to defer to state court determina-
tions.2" Because comity necessitates respecting the co-equal role of state and
ism."). This statement opens the Court's opinion in a case regarding the respect that federal
habeas courts owe states when reviewing claims of state prisoners. Id.; see also Crime Bill
Issues: Hearing on S. 735 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California) ("[lIn our system of govern-
ment, state courts are coequal institutions with their federal counterparts and have the same
responsibility to uphold the U.S. Constitution. To permit federal intrusion and independent
relitigation of matters properly and reasonably in state court is to relegate state courts to mere
fact finding panels .. ").
264. (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). The Court went on to state
the following:
There is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance these doctrines. Federal
habeas corpus principles must inform and shape the historic and still vital relation
of mutual respect and common purpose existing between the States and the federal
courts. In keeping this delicate balance we have been careful to limit the scope of
federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the States'
interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings.
Id. This Williams decision, released on the same day as (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362 (2000), involved petitioner Michael Williams, and the issue concerned the circumstances
under which federal courts must hold evidentiary hearings per AEDPA. (Michael) Williams,
529 U.S. at 424.
265. See Wright v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (1 1th Cir. 2002)
(noting that Congress plainly intended amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to require greater
federal court deference to state court decisions and to promote more federal-state judicial
comity); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that requirements in
AEDPA are predicated on comity, ensuring that state courts have first opportunity to review
federal constitutional challenges to state convictions, thus preserving role of state courts in
protecting federally guaranteed rights).
266. See supra Part ll.C (discussing criticisms of dual sovereignty doctrine and arguing
that notion of federalism given by Supreme Court to justify dual sovereignty exception is
erroneous).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 185 (2003)
federal sovereigns within the system of federalism, the correct notion of
comity would prevent federal courts from relitigating issues upon which a
state court has previously ruled. In fact, Congress recognized this correct
notion of comity when it drafted and passed AEDPA.
This correct notion of comity, the one underlying AEDPA and this Note,
is the one that should govern in the dual sovereignty context. Thus, federal
courts in successive prosecutions under dual sovereignty should defer to prior
state court suppression rulings just as federal courts must now defer to state
court rulings under AEDPA. Relitigating these issues denies state courts the
respect that they deserve as equal sovereigns within the federal system and
undermines the power of state courts to decide issues of federal law within
their province."'
B. The Proposal in Practice
As discussed, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 codifies the correct standard for federal
court review of state court decisions in the habeas context."'8 Under this
standard, which this Note refers to as "AEDPA's rule of comity," federal
courts must give complete deference to state court findings of fact, substantial
deference to findings on mixed questions of law and fact, and some deference
to findings of law.2 9 This Note proposes that federal courts should use this
rule of comity in successive federal prosecutions under the dual sovereignty
exception when considering suppression of evidence issues previously liti-
gated in state court.
This subpart outlines how federal courts should apply AEDPA's rule of
comity in these situations. Initially, the federal court in such a proceeding
should determine whether the state court suppression ruling concerned a
question of fact, question of law, or mixed question of law and fact.270 Fourth
267. See TarynA. Merkl, Note, The Federalization ofCriminalLaw andDouble Jeopardy,
31 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 175, 196 (1999) (stating that "[a]llowing one sovereign in a
federal system to disrupt the judgments of another sovereign may result in undesirable
consequences-one sovereign could significantly undermine the first sovereign's strength and
legitimacy").
268. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing standards of review under § 2254(d)).
269. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing standards of review under § 2254(d)).
270. Considering the steps that a trial court takes in resolving a Fourth Amendment motion
to suppress is helpful in this situation. First, the court establishes the "basic, primary, or
historical facts." LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 11.7(c) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728
F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984)). Next, the court selects the applicable rule of law. Id.
Finally, the court determines "whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or
is not violated." Id. This final step is the most troublesome for standard of review purposes.
Id. Also note that AEDPA's deferential standard of review applies only to cases actually
adjudicated before the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (limiting deference to claims
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Amendment cases can involve each of these categories of review, but the most
frequent standard used for reviewing a suppression ruling is that of mixed law
and fact.271 Then, the federal court, acting in a fashion similar to its role as a
habeas court, should review the previous state court suppression ruling under
the standards dictated by Congress in AEDPA.272
If the federal court determines that the suppression issue in the earlier
state proceeding involved a factual determination, such as "who, when, what,
and where," the comity accorded to the earlier state suppression ruling per
AEDPA should be one of complete deference.273 An example of a question
of fact would be a state court's determination of whether the police made
threats to a defendant prior to the defendant's purported consent.274 Thus, in
the dual sovereignty context, if a state court suppressed evidence because it
determined that an invalid search occurred under these facts, the federal court
in a subsequent federal prosecution should give complete deference to this
factual finding.
275
If the federal court determines that the suppression issue in the earlier
state proceeding involved a purely legal determination,276 such as whether the
that were "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings"). Thus, in deciding whether
to defer to the state court suppression ruling, the federal court must assess if the state court
actually adjudicated the specific Fourth Amendment issue before the federal court. However,
because this Note's proposal applies only to situations in which the state court suppressed the
evidence on federal constitutional grounds, this requirement will invariably be met.
271. See LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 11.7(c) (noting that appellate review of Fourth
Amendment cases involves review of facts, law, and mixed questions of law and fact). These
are the standards that courts traditionally use on direct review. Id. However, state prisoners are
rarely able to obtain an adjudication of their Fourth Amendment claims on collateral review in
federal habeas courts. Id. at § 11.7(g) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). Under
Stone, federal habeas courts may only review Fourth Amendment claims if the state failed to
"provideB an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim." Stone, 428
U.S. at 494. The limited availability of federal habeas remedies for state prisoners on the basis
of Fourth Amendment claims further supports this Note's proposal-that federal courts should
give deferential review to state court findings on Fourth Amendment claims in the dual
sovereignty context.
272. Thus, federal courts will be familiar with these proposed standards because they are
the same standards that federal courts currently apply to habeas petitions per AEDPA.
273. See LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 11.7(c) (identifying common types of questions
involved in reviewing factual determinations).
274. See id. (giving example of question of fact review from State v. Jones, 475 A.2d 1087
(Conn. 1984)). In this example, police threats prior to consent would invalidate the search. Id.
275. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text (discussing question of fact review
under AEDPA).
276. Situations involving the review of pure legal determinations will be rare and difficult
to identify. See supra Part V.B.2 (noting inherent difficulty in separating question of law from
mixed question of law and fact).
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invalid portions of a warrant are severable from the valid portions, the comity
accorded to the earlier state suppression ruling per AEDPA should be a small
degree of deference under the "contrary to... clearly established Federal law"
standard.277 The legal determinations that the court must make in this case are
whether the valid portions of the warrant are sufficiently particularized,
whether the valid portions are distinguishable from the invalid portions, and
whether the valid portions make up the greater part of the warrant.278 If the
warrant satisfies this legal standard, then the court will uphold the warrant.279
Thus, in the dual sovereignty context, if a state court suppressed evidence
because it determined that the warrant was invalid under this legal standard,
then the federal court in a subsequent federal prosecution must review the
state court's suppression ruling under the "contrary to. . .clearly established
Federal law" standard." ° As discussed in Part V.B.2, per AEDPA, a decision
is only "contrary" if the Supreme Court has specifically ruled on the issue and
the state court misapplies this law.2 ' In this situation, if the federal court
finds the state court ruling "contrary" to Supreme Court jurisprudence, then
the federal court should represent its sovereign interests by independently
relitigating the suppression issue. 22
Finally, if, as will most often be the case, the federal court determines that
the suppression issue in the earlier state proceeding involved a mixed question
of law and fact, such as whether or the not the police conducted a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment, then the comity accorded to the earlier state
277. See LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 11.7(c) (giving example of question of law review).
Under the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must be based on suffi-
ciently particularized information; but, as in this example, situations arise in which a warrant
contains both valid and invalid components. See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 79 (2d
Cir. 1992) (discussing severability doctrine). Under the severability doctrine, if the valid
portions of the warrant are severable from the invalid portions, the warrant is valid and thus the
search was proper. Id.
278. See United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying
severability doctrine as review of question of law).
279. Id.
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (codifying "contrary to... clearly established
Federal law" standard).
281. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing standard of review under AEDPA).
282. Interestingly, in this randomly chosen example, the "severability doctrine" does not
appear to be "clearly established Federal law." See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 79
(2d Cir. 1992) (noting that while "never explicitly considering the appropriateness of severance,
as such, we have long accepted the underpinning of that doctrine"). Thus, if a federal court
found that a state court misapplied the severability doctrine, then the federal court should give
deference to the state court's finding because, per a strict reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the
Supreme Court has not specifically established the severability doctrine. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2000) (codifying AEDPA's deference provisions).
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suppression ruling per AEDPA should be substantial deference under the
"unreasonableness" standard." 3 In this mixed law/fact example, in order to
decide whether or not a search occurred, the state court must determine
whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy that was reasonable under
societal standards.284 A court must consider factual issues such as the defen-
dant's own privacy expectation and legal issues such as what type of expecta-
tion case law demonstrates is reasonable. Thus, in the dual sovereignty con-
text, if a state court suppressed evidence because it determined that the defen-
dant had an expectation of privacy that was reasonable under societal stan-
dards, then the federal court in a subsequent federal prosecution must review
this determination under an "unreasonableness" standard.8 ' Per the Supreme
Court's decision in Williams, even if the federal court "concludes in its inde-
pendent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly estab-
lished federal law erroneously or incorrectly," it may not relitigate the issue.2"6
Rather, the federal court can only relitigate the issue if the state court's applica-
tion was "unreasonable.""2 ' If the federal court, after this deferential review,
determines that the previous state court suppression ruling was in fact "unrea-
sonable," then and only then should the federal court allow the relitigation of
the suppression issue.
Indeed, only in those situations in which the state court decision is truly
"unreasonable" will the federal court have a significant interest in acting in its
sovereign capacity to relitigate the issue.288 In these rare cases, the societal
283. See LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 11.7(c) (describing one commonly appealed mixed
question of law and fact).
284. Id. Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, if the police search an area in which the
defendant had an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, then a search
occurred. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(outlining test for search per Fourth Amendment). Unless the police previously obtained a
warrant to conduct a search, the court must suppress the evidence that the police obtained. Id.
at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (2000) (codifying "unreasonable" standard).
286. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,411 (2000).
287. Id. Admittedly, federal courts are having difficulty distinguishing between reasonably
and unreasonably erroneous applications of federal law. See Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151,
155 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The Supreme Court has thus far offered little guidance as to the meaning
of the term 'unreasonable application,' tautologically instructing federal habeas courts to ask
whether the state court's application was objectively unreasonable."). However, the Court
recently explained that "unreasonable application" must be more than "clear error." Lockyer
v. Andrade, 588 U.S. ______, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1174-75 (2003).
A division among courts also exists on whether a federal habeas court must determine
whether the state court's analysis of the habeas claim was unreasonable or rather should just
determine whether the outcome selected by the state court was unreasonable. See Pettys, supra
note 247, at 754 (noting disagreements among lower federal courts after Williams).
288. See Brittany Glidden, When the State is Silent: An Analysis ofAEDPA 'sAdjudication
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interests of deterrence, retribution, and restoration of the public confidence are
so important that the federal court should exercise its sovereign power to
vindicate the interests of its people. But when the state court decision is not
"unreasonable," which in the majority of cases it likely will not be, the rule of
comity behind AEDPA should apply, and the federal court should defer to the
state court's suppression ruling. Therefore, this Note proposes that these
outlined standards are the appropriate rules ofcomity that federal courts should
afford state court suppression rulings in the dual sovereignty context.
C. Potential Criticisms of the Proposal
Admittedly, this Note's proposal is a novel one. No research indicates
that it has been written about or proposed. Several possible criticisms of this
Note, then, are readily apparent.
The most widely cited rationale for the dual sovereignty doctrine-that
prohibiting successive prosecutions would undermine the ability of a sovereign
to vindicate its interests in the enforcement of its own laws--conflicts with this
Note's proposal." 9 If federal courts did defer to previous state court suppres-
sion rulings in successive federal prosecutions under dual sovereignty, as this
Note proposes, then this deference might seriously hamper the subsequent
federal prosecution. In fact, in many situations the federal government would
lose a key piece of evidence likely necessary for the conviction of the criminal
defendant. If the federal government thus lost the ability to prosecute the
defendant, it could not represent its sovereign interests effectively. Given
modem Supreme Court jurisprudence reaffirming the dual sovereignty doc-
trine,"' critics would argue that deference to state courts in these situations
would undermine federalism. While such a criticism does have facial appeal,
the logic behind this argument is faulty, much like the logic behind the dual
sovereignty exception itself.
First, unlike the time of the inception of the dual sovereignty doctrine,
federal and state governments today often cooperate with one another in
investigating and prosecuting crimes.291 They cooperate with one another
because they share the problems of a common constituency, the people of the
United States, and therefore believe that they can fight crime more effectively
by working together rather than by functioning as separate sovereigns.2
Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 183 (2001) (noting that AEDPA's
standard "limits the situations where federal courts may reverse a state decision to those with
the most egregious state court errors").
289. See supra Part ]I.C (discussing rationale of dual sovereignty doctrine).
290. See supra Part U.B (discussing modem extension of dual sovereignty doctrine).
291. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing "cooperative federalism").
292. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing "cooperative federalism").
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Second, dual sovereignty conflicts with comity. Principles of federalism and
comity require respecting the judgments of the other sovereign; in the dual
sovereignty context, however, sovereigns give no such respect to one another.
Instead, they actively reprosecute a defendant that another sovereign has
already prosecuted and refuse to give any deference to the earlier sovereign's
judgment.
Finally, the interests of individuals-which are at the heart of federal-
ism-are at stake in these dual prosecutions.293 The interests of the federal
government in such reprosecutions are small in relation to the interests of the
individual whom the state government has already subjected to the harassment,
embarrassment, and expense of one prosecution-a prosecution that,
concededly, has already served the criminal law justifications of deterrence and
retribution just as well as could a subsequent federal prosecution. Thus, these
concerns do not support the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine; rather,
these concerns demonstrate that current principles of comity and federalism
should prevent the federal relitigation of these suppression issues in most
cases.
But, as noted in Part VIB, situations will exist in which the federal
government is justified in relitigating such suppression issues. These will be
the situations in which AEDPA would mandate that no deference be given to
the state court judgment because it was "unreasonable" or "contrary to...
clearly established Federal law." '294 In fact, these will be the cases that most
implicate the federal government's interest as sovereign. In these cases, the
state court has behaved so irrationally that it has not served the interests of
deterrence, retribution, and restoration of the public confidence. In these cases,
the federal government will be justified in representing its sovereign interest
by relitigating the matter because only these cases strongly implicate the
sovereign's interest in enforcing its own laws.
It is also problematic that this Note seeks to analogize the congressional
intent behind a very specific statute to another area of law. AEDPA concerns
the law of habeas corpus, an extremely complex and controversial body of law
that has historical roots predating this country. Critics could argue that habeas
is simply "exceptional." '295 Professor Steiker presents the very interesting
argument that habeas corpus law, because of its unusual historical status and
the Supreme Court's own distinctive treatment of it, is not a promising vehicle
for elaborating general constitutional principles. 96 One cannot easily dismiss
293. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("[Flederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power.").
294. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (codifying AEDPA).
295. See Steiker, supra note 123, at 1707 (arguing "habeas exceptionalism").
296. Id. at 1730.
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such an argument. Habeas corpus is different. The origin and history of
habeas corpus is both unusual and distinct.2" Its status as the "Great Writ of
Liberty" and its use by various branches of government as a tool in their
repeated struggle for power makes it a difficult vehicle for analogy.
But, as previously discussed, several compelling reasons establish why
habeas is a good vehicle in this analysis. First, as its history shows, habeas
corpus and federalism are innately intertwined.2 Because "habeas corpus [is
a] medium [for] the dialogue of federalism between the federal and state
courts," 2" it is the most appropriate and useful vehicle for studying the current
congressional view on the rule of comity. Second, AEDPA concerns the
correct standard for federal court collateral review of state court actions.
Because successive federal prosecutions that occur under dual sovereignty are
similar to those that occur under federal habeas review, the standard of review
should also be similar.3" The motives of Congress in enacting AEDPA and the
Supreme Court's Williams decision demonstrate their concern that federal
courts should respect the proper role of state courts as equal arbiters of ques-
tions of federal law. This concern is especially relevant when a federal court
proceeding is collateral to a state court action. In these situations, to permit
federal courts independently to relitigate a matter that was properly before a
state court undermines the system of federalism, whether that relitigation
occurs in a federal habeas proceeding or in a successive federal prosecution
under dual sovereignty. Therefore, although the argument that habeas is
"exceptional" has ample force, habeas is still a good vehicle for studying
federal-state relations, and habeas corpus proceedings are so similar to collat-
eral proceedings under dual sovereignty that the congressional intent behind
AEDPA should weigh heavily on the actions of federal courts in the dual
sovereignty context.
Finally, critics may argue that this Note's interpretation of the legislative
intent behind AEDPA, mandating deference to state courts, ignores Congress's
interest in reforming federal habeas corpus for federal prisoners.'O° AEDPA
297. See supra Part IV.A. 1 (discussing origin and history of writ of habeas corpus).
298. See supra Part IVA.1 (discussing habeas corpus and federalism).
299. DUKER, supra note 115, at 156.
300. See Powers of Congress, supra note 193, at 1569-72 (going further by proposing that
AEDPA's standard of review can apply to direct review of state court actions by federal courts).
301. Another possible criticism of this Note's proposal is that deference to state courts
would take away from the federal courts' Article H[1 power to "say what the law is." Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see supra note 193 (discussing views of
scholars who argue that AEDPA is unconstitutional). Exploration of this issue is beyond the
scope of this Note. However, the Supreme Court has thus far rejected claims that AEDPA is
unconstitutional. See generally Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651 (1996). The legislative history behind AEDPA also suggests that Congress rejected
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did significantly reform 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal statute governing
postconviction remedies for federal prisoners."° Congress, in reforming the
habeas corpus process for both federal and state prisoners, clearly manifested
an interest in bringing finality to the criminal justice process. 3 But the great
bulk of debate and controversy over AEDPA concerned the deference provi-
sions to state courts104 Preventing federal court religitation of issues properly
before state courts was indeed the "crown jewel" of the reforms.0 5 Members
of Congress felt that deference to state courts could best bring finality to the
collateral appeal process .3 0 Thus, although AEDPA undoubtedly reflected
other goals, the principal idea behind the reforms centered on reducing the
federal courts' micromanagement of state court decisions.
D. Summary
The endurance of comity is essential to maintaining the federalist nature
of the United States' system of government by insuring that federal and state
courts each respect the role of the other in the American judiciary.3c How-
ever, when federal courts allow the admission of evidence that a state court
previously suppressed on federal constitutional grounds, this relitigation
denies state courts the respect that they deserve as equal arbiters of questions
such criticisms. See Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 59 (1995) (statement of Gale Norton, Attorney General of Colorado)
(stating that critics who claim that reform violates United States Constitution ignore critical fact
that "[i]t was Congress that made the most major expansion of habeas review. Accordingly, it
is uniquely within the province of this body to make changes to the habeas statutes that will
preserve the States' role as the principal enforcer of our nation's criminal laws").
302. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (governing remedies on motions attacking sentences for
those in federal custody).
303. See 141 CONG. REc. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The
resulting lack of finality [from the state and federal collateral appeal process] saps public
confidence in our criminal justice system and undermines the proper roles of the State and
Federal Government.").
304. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text (discussing debate over deference
provisions in AEDPA).
305. See 142 CONG. REC. H3607 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr)
(calling deference in habeas reform "crown jewel").
306. See 141 CONG. REC. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("Meaningful reform will stop repeated assaults upon fair and valid State convictions through
spurious petitions filed in the Federal courts. We cannot stop the spurious petitions without
changing the standard under which these petitions are reviewed.").
307. See 141 CONG. REc. 57835 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(discussing frustration with federal courts' micromanagement of state court decisions).
308. See supra Part VI.A (discussing importance of comity in maintaining federalist
system).
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of federal law. To remedy this incongruity, this Note proposes that federal
courts should apply AEDPA's rule of comity to suppression rulings in succes-
sive prosecutions under dual sovereignty. This Part outlined how federal
courts should treat questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact when
considering evidence that a state court previously suppressed on Fourth
Amendment grounds. In most cases, deference to the state court suppression
ruling will be most appropriate. However, this Note does concede that federal
courts should represent their sovereign interests by relitigating the evidentiary
issue in cases in which the state court has acted irrationally. This Part also
explored the possible criticisms of this Note's proposal. While each has
merit, this Part made strong arguments to rebut these criticisms, thus reinforc-
ing the feasibility and significance of this Note's proposal.
VII. Conclusion
In 1959, Justice Black wrote in his dissent inAbbate v. United States: "I
am ... not convinced that a State and the Nation can be considered two
wholly separate sovereignties for the purpose of allowing them to do together
what, generally, neither can do separately."3"9 Over forty years later, Justice
Black's concern remains true. It is a concern that scholars, courts, and legal
practitioners continue to invoke when criticizing the dual sovereignty doc-
trine, and it is a concern that is even more poignant in this day of "cooperative
federalism." 310
Currently, in successive federal prosecutions occurring under the dual
sovereignty exception, federal courts allow the introduction of evidence that
a state court suppressed on federal constitutional grounds without considering
the previous state court suppression ruding.1 To justify the relitigation of
these evidentiary matters, federal courts invoke the dual sovereignty doctrine
coupled with principles of collateral estoppel.3" 2 However, since the passage
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, federal courts
no longer can ignore the inconsistency in the application of a notion of comity
that expressly mandates independent relitigation of issues in the dual sover-
eignty context, but expressly prevents such relitigation in the habeas
context.
313
309. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
310. See supra Part II.C (discussing criticisms of dual sovereignty doctrine).
311. See supra Part III.B (discussing cases in which federal courts allowed admission of
evidence that state court previously suppressed).
312. See supra Part Il.B (discussing reasoning of federal courts that did not give previous
state court suppression rulings collateral estoppel effect).
313. See supra Part V (discussing AEDPA's rule of comity).
THE NEED FOR COMITY
Ultimately, this Note's purpose is to make federal courts consider how
they review the decisions of state courts in the dual sovereignty context.
Instead of blindly adhering to the dual sovereignty doctrine, federal courts
should respect recent congressional action in the habeas context, a context so
similar to dual sovereignty that AEDPA's reforms should weigh heavily on
federal judicial treatment of previous state court suppression rulings. Thus,
this Note proposes that a federal court considering evidence that a state court
previously suppressed in the dual sovereignty context should follow AEDPA's
rule of comity by giving complete deference to findings on questions of fact,
substantial deference to findings on mixed questions of law and fact, and
some deference to findings on questions of federal law.314
This Note does not merely advocate that these notions of federalism and
comity should govern simply out of respect for the federalist system; this Note
advocates that these notions should govern out of respect for the individual
rights that the system of federalism protects. As the Supreme Court has noted:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit
of the States or state governments as abstract political entities ... the
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for
the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
"Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power."
315
In particular, the prohibition against double jeopardy is of such fundamental
importance that the dual sovereignty exception should be limited and narrowly
tailored to serve those societal interests that take precedence over the interests
of an individual.316 This Note's proposal would help to ensure that these
individual liberties are protected while enabling the federal government to
protect society's interest in the enforcement of criminal laws in situations in
which the state court has acted truly irrationally.311 Anything short of this
deferential approach will continue to undermine the federalist nature of the
American judicial system, as federal courts exhibit deference and respect to
state court judgments in some areas but not in others. Anything short of this
314. See supra Part VI.B (outlining proposal for federal court deference to state court
suppression rulings in dual sovereignty context).
315. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
316. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental nature of
double jeopardy protection).
317. See supra Part VI.B (outlining proposal for federal court deference to state court
suppression rulings in dual sovereignty context).
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approach will also continue to undermine the individual rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
